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# West Europe Report

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9 November 1981

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No. 1848

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## BRIEFS

NETHERLANDS BUYING DANISH WINDMILLS--Volund's division in Viborg has sold three large windmills to the homeland of windmills, Holland. The windmills, which are 265 kW each, will be placed along the Atlantic coast of Holland. They represent a value of around 8 million kroner. These are the biggest industrially-produced mills in Denmark and the first mills of this size ever to be exported. The Sonder-jylland High Tension Plant had already bought a similar mill which is now ready and waiting to be set up. Volund did not wish to release the name of the buyer at this time. Volund sales chief Jose Illanes told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that at the moment Volund is being flooded with inquiries about the firm's mills as a result of the exhibit of a smaller windmill in Nairobi during the UN conference on new and lasting energy sources last month. Negotiations are continuing on the sale of two 500-kW mills to Kenya and there have been positive inquiries from many other lands. Volund's demonstration mill in Nairobi was given to Kenya by Energy Minister Poul Nielson and will be set up in its permanent location very soon. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Sep 81 p 9] 6578

CSO: 3106/3

## INDEBTEDNESS OF CEMA COUNTRIES TO AUSTRIA

Vienna INTERNATIONALE WIRTSCHAFT in German 25 Sep 81 p 6

[Column by Stankovsky: "The Debts of the Eastern Countries Grow Larger"]

[Text] According to a special report by the Austrian national bank, overall indebtedness of CEMA countries with Austrian banks rose from 69 billion Schillings at the end of 1980 to 81.5 billion Schillings by the middle of 1981. Net indebtedness, after deduction of CEMA assets in Austrian banks, totaled 67 billion Schillings (as against 52.5 billion at the end of 1980). Within a half year, Eastern debts have grown by almost 15 billion Schillings, which is indicative of a marked acceleration as against prior trends. In part, this rise in indebtedness is due to the fact that dollar obligations now constitute a higher Schilling amount as a consequence of the revaluation of the dollar. But this does not reflect a "statistical" effect alone. Since the East bloc countries invoice their exports (exclusive of petroleum) in Schillings to a large extent, they must also pay for these "exchange rate losses" in case the dollar rate does not go back down again.

Poland was the greatest debtor, owing Austrian banks a net total of 25.5 billion Schillings. As against late 1980, the Polish debt rose by 1.5 billion Schillings. The second-highest debt was that of the GDR (13.5 billion, a rise of 3.5 billion) and Hungary was third with 9.5 billion Schillings. Romania's debt (3.5 billion) was relatively small. But like Poland, Romania has very meager bank assets which may in part explain her payment problems. The GDR, on the other hand, has substantial bank assets in Austria.

Net indebtedness of CEMA countries in Austria is said to have totaled some 91 billion Schillings overall by the middle of 1981. In addition to the abovementioned amounts, there are some 6 billion Schillings in bank debts not covered by the special report and some 18 billion Schillings in obligations to Austrian export firms.

According to the Basel Bank for International Settlements, total East bloc indebtedness with Western banks amounted to a gross sum of \$58.8 billion at the end of March 1981, and a net sum of 47.4 billion; to this must be added government and trade credits amounting to more than \$26 billion.

CEMA Indebtedness to Austrian Banks <sup>1)</sup>

	Gross		Net <sup>2)</sup>	
	12/80	6/81	12/80	6/81
	Billions of Schillings			
Bulgaria	2.6	2.5	0.6	0.7
CSSR	6.7	7.5	5.0	6.9
GDR	14.1	19.9	9.4	13.1
Poland	24.9	25.9	24.2	25.7
Romania	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.5
Hungary	10.5	12.0	8.4	9.6
Subtotal East Europe	62.5	71.6	51.1	59.5
USSR	6.3	9.8	1.2	7.7
Total CEMA	68.8	81.4	52.3	67.2

1) Based on Austrian national bank special report; 2) Minus assets with Austrian banks

## Net CEMA Indebtedness in Austria

	East Bloc Totals		Poland	
	12/80	6/81	12/80	6/81
	Billions of Schillings			
Banks (special report) <sup>1)</sup>	52.1	67.2	24.2	25.7
Banks (unrecorded) <sup>1)</sup>	5.0	6.0 <sup>3)</sup>	1.6	2.0 <sup>3)</sup>
Trade Credits <sup>2)</sup>	17.0	18.0	not available	
Total	74.1	91.2	not available	
Credit Pledges	20.6	18.2	11.7	4.4

1) Difference between foreign statistics (full survey) and special survey report by Austrian national bank; 2) of the export firms (estimates); 3) estimates

9478

CSO: 3103/49

## STATISTICS OFFICE REPORTS BUSINESS PROFITS OFF 50 PERCENT SINCE 1973

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Sep 81 p 9

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard]

[Text] Since the economic crisis set in in 1973 industrial profits have been cut in half in terms of fixed purchasing power.

This can be shown now that the Danish Statistics Bureau has brought out its industrial balance sheet for 1980.

Total industrial profits before taxes have dropped from 4.9 billion kroner in 1979 to 4.4 billion in 1980. That is a decline of 10 percent in current prices and 20 percent in terms of fixed purchasing power.

Jorgen Hansen, chief economist with the Industrial Council: "The figures show that industrial earnings continue to decline in terms of both current and fixed prices. Compared to 1973 profits are now only half as much measured in fixed prices and that means we can purchase fewer new jobs. And company taxes have shot up since 1973, also limiting industry's chances for investing in new jobs."


The figures from the Danish Statistics Bureau show that industrial solidity is declining which means that an increased share of total financing must come from borrowed money. This means even greater interest burdens in the future which will further erode future profits. Industry is entering a vicious circle.

While industry's interest burden rose as much as 33 percent from 1979 to 1980 wage costs rose about 11 percent. Since wage costs weigh much more heavily than interest this increase played a decisive role for the earning situation of industry.

Economists with the Industrial Council told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that while firm profits from 1973 to 1980 rose only a measly 7 percent in current prices, hourly wages rose 140 percent in the same period--20 times as much.

The chart shows industrial profit developments during the economic crisis. Ever since 1976 there has been an abrupt and steady decline in industrial profits and thus industry's ability to create more jobs.

Chief economist Jorgen Hansen of the Industrial Council: "Higher earnings are sorely needed. If we are to realize our Industrial Plan for 1987 investments must be twice the current level."



Industrial Profits Before Taxes

Source: Business economic division of the Industrial Council

Key:

1. Current prices

2. Fixed prices

6578

CSO: 3106/3

## BRIEFS

DROP IN NEW CONSTRUCTION--Unless political changes are made in conditions for private and public construction, the construction branch will not emerge from the present crisis this side of 1984. This was the conclusion of a study of future prospects for the construction sector made by the Labor Market Board in Fredriksborg County. The Labor Market Board collected budget material from the 19 primary communities in the area as well as from the county administration. The study showed that new construction fell 43 percent from 1979 to 1980 in the Fredriksborg County region. The decline was 37 percent for the nation as a whole. The study says there will be unchanged municipal activity in the construction sector until 1984. This must be seen against the background that the average construction activity of all the municipalities in the country declined by a fourth from 1979 to 1981. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Sep 81 p 1] 6578

CSO: 3106/3

## BRIEFS

TREASURY HAS BUDGET SURPLUS--The surplus in the Greenland national treasury was three times larger than expected in 1980. This was due to substantially higher revenue than anticipated according to Godthab newspaper SERMITSIAK. The surplus grew from 21.6 to 75.7 million kroner. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Sep 81 p 3] 6578

CSO: 3106/3



## COUNTRY TO RENDER THIRD WORLD TECHNICAL AID

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 16 Sep 81 pp 1, 13

[Article by Yalcin Egilmez]

[Text] At the second day of Asian-African Nations' Legal Information Committee meetings, the Kuwait Fund and the Arab Fund Financing Organizations agreed to give financial aid in the amounts requested as part of technical and economic aid to Arab and Asian countries.

At yesterday's session of the meetings, which continue to be closed to the press, being held at the Istanbul Marmara Etap Hotel, the Islamic Development Bank, the Kuwait Fund, and the Arab Fund Financing Organizations approved the principle of providing financial support in addition to the support on technical and investment cooperative projects given one another by the developing nations. Minister of Industry and Technology Sahap Kocatopcu, who chairs the meetings, Kuwait Fund Director General Faysal Abdul Razzak al-Khaled, Arab Fund Delegation Chairman Hasan Omer Ahmet, and officials from other nations attending the meetings reported that they are pleased by the financial support of the Islamic Bank.

At the meetings, Turkish entrepreneurs and businessmen sought to repeat that they are continuing to cooperate and assist from the standpoint of technology in joint investments in Asian and African nations. In the meantime, it was learned that the Arab Nations and Financing Organizations demonstrated approval of and interest in investments in African countries in particular.

In a statement made during the meetings, Minister of Industry and Technology Kocatopcu said that discussions were "very positive." He went on:

"It was decided to foster cooperation among developing countries. It was understood at these meetings that Turkish businessmen and technology have an important place in the dialogue of Asian and African nations. Asian and African nations also place importance on our joint investments. So that cooperation, technical and investment cooperation, can achieve rapid results, each country must look at and examine each of its foreign-capital

and tax laws. Efforts must be made to complete these examinations within a short period of time. We are also working at these meetings to determine which investments will be given priority. The Kuwait Fund, Arab Fund, and Islamic Development Bank decided to give every sort of financial support they possess in order to accelerate this cooperation and to strengthen the Asian and African nations. At this meeting, which has been extremely positive, the topics of capital, raw materials, technology, and marketing have also been emphasized."

The delegations, which were honored at a dinner hosted by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry and the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce last night, will, in two groups, tour the industrial facilities of Eczacibasi, the Turkish Bottle and Glass Company, CBS, Arcelik, ALAMSAS, the Heavy Machinery Industry Corporation, MAN, Kaleporselen, Profilo, Aksu, and the Hydraulic Machinery Industry and Trade Corporation.

At a dinner given the night before last by Minister of Industry and Technology Kocatopcu, the female and male guests attending the Asian-African meetings were seen following the Islamic custom of dining at separate tables.

11673

CSO: 4654/4

## CENTRAL BANK CHAIRMAN: TIGHT MONEY POLICY TO CONTINUE

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 8 Sep 81 p 5

[Text] In a speech given at the 11th interbank gentlemen's meeting held in Istanbul yesterday, Central Bank Chairman Osman Siklar said, "Since we are not going to forget about inflation, we will maintain the tight money policy. However, production and investment will continue to be encouraged through emphasis on the selective credit policy. We will follow economic developments closely and make decisions as needed."

Siklar, who noted that there are still complaints about stagnation and tight money on the market, stated that it is necessary to maintain the tight money policy because inflation is not completely halted. Central Bank Chairman Siklar stressed that, along with the tight money policy, sufficient financing to ensure that the economy can grow will be provided. He continued:

"In the first 7 months of 1981, Central Bank credits rose by 20.2 percent; banknote issues, 26.7 percent; deposit banks' credits, 29.5 percent; and deposits, 36 percent. In comparison with the same period last year, increases in Central Bank credits, banknote issues, and currency demand are much lower, and increases in bank credits and deposits in particular are greater.

"Therefore, the rate of increase of monetary indicators has slowed down."

11673

CSO: 4654/2

## CHANGES MADE IN PROCEDURES FOR BORROWED MONEY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 17 Sep 81 p 9

[Text] Ministry of Finance and Central Bank notices, which clarify procedures within the framework of amendments to the Law Regarding Procedures To Provide Borrowed Money, have been published.

Those who loan money for the purpose of earning money from interest along with individuals and corporate bodies who serve as intermediaries in the sale of stocks and bonds cannot perform the functions given to banks nor can they use banks' powers.

According to the notice published in yesterday's issue of the RESMI GAZETE, money brokers will be able to loan money only to the limit of their capital, and the interest and commission they receive cannot exceed the amount banks receive when giving credit. Stock-exchange brokers, who trade in stocks and bonds and who market shares, securities, and deposit certificates, will be able to continue their activities as usual. These brokers, who remain outside the Law Regarding Procedures to Provide Borrowed Money, will market stocks and bonds without collecting money termed deposits under the Capital Market Law and will continue to give their customers the profits and interest on stocks and bonds that they obtain.

The Ministry of Finance notice reads as follows:

"Article 1: The Ministry of Finance, under Law No 2520, has the authority to determine the minimum and maximum interest rates, fees, and profits that can be obtained from borrowed money provided by individuals or corporate bodies other than those organizations given such authority by special laws and those organizations that come under the jurisdiction of the Banking Law. The Ministry of Finance also has the authority to set down the conditions that will be applied, the areas of activities, and the working principles of individuals and corporate bodies that provide borrowed money in order to earn money from interest and that act as intermediaries in the sale of stocks and bonds.

"Article 2: Individuals and corporate bodies that provide borrowed money for the purpose of earning money from interest and that act as intermediaries in the sale of stocks and bonds cannot perform the functions of or use the authority restricted to banks by the Banking Law.

"Article 3: Permission must be obtained from the Ministry of Finance in order to reopen bureaus and branches so as to perform the activities of the individuals and corporate bodies that are spoken of in Law No 2520.

"Article 4: From the time this notice becomes effective, the interest rates demanded for borrowed money provided by individuals and corporate bodies that provide borrowed money in order to earn money from interest cannot exceed banks' declared interest rates for each of the short, moderate, and long-term loans (credits).

"Article 5: The lengths of terms of loans approved by banks for short, moderate, and long-term loans will be the same as those of individuals and corporate bodies that come under the jurisdiction of this notice when determining interest rates relative to lengths of terms.

"Article 6: Expenses and commissions for borrowed money from banks that were set in accordance with Law No 7/5825 dated 10 February 1973 can be collected under the same conditions as those laid down for individuals and corporate bodies that come under the jurisdiction of this notice and that deal with providing borrowed money and with the stipulation that expenses and commissions do not exceed those collected by banks.

"Article 7: Individuals and corporate bodies that deal with providing borrowed money are required to keep registered accounts in accordance with Article 6 of Law No 2279.

"Article 8: Individuals and corporate bodies that deal with providing borrowed money are required to carry out the statutes of Article 7 of Law No 2279.

"Article 9: This notice goes into effect on the date of its publication."

#### Central Bank Notice

In accordance with the Central Bank notice, brokers must receive prior permission from the Central Bank for notices and advertisements that they wish to place in the press, on the radio or television, and in all other forms. To do so, brokers will fill out completely and accurately a "request for permission for notices and advertisements form," a sample of which appears in the RESMI GAZETE, will add to the form the text of the notice or advertisement, and will submit these to the Central Bank Banking Directorate General Investment Market Directorate. Brokers may release their notice or advertisement after the application form is stamped "approved" by the Central Bank. Under the notice, so long as the notice or

advertisement is not changed, it will not need to be approved again. In accordance with the notice, brokers who seek prior permission from the Central Bank for notices or advertisements they will release after 15 October 1981 will add to their application form a document that states that they have applied for a permit from the Ministry of Finance.

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CSO: 4654/4

## TUSIAD CALLS FOR EXPORT REGULATION REVISION

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 25 Sep 81 p 5

[Text of excerpted TUSIAD export report]

[Text] An export report published by TUSIAD [Turkish Association of Industrialists and Businessmen] examines, in detail, bureaucratic obstacles and export regulations that limit development of exportation and puts forth several proposals. The report evaluates current incentive measures and presents these views in its section on conclusions and proposals:

The present-day export system brings to mind a shawl almost completely covered with patches and is a long way from giving the appearance of a modern system.

At present, there are 16 official organizations that handle exportation and 13 laws and more than 20 decisions that regulate the subject. The exporter must obtain a document and deal with formalities that take months to complete. Premiums (taxes) collected from exportation have undergone 15 changes since 25 January.

Export incentive regulations have seen close to 20 amendments since 25 January 1980. Permission from the ministry is required for 48 export goods, and the exportation of 29 goods is prohibited. Exportation is a race to sell the highest quality goods at the lowest price. If we wear down, exhaust, and wear out our own exporters before the race even begins, we will never be able to send a single entry into the export Olympics.

The time has long come and gone for Turkish exporters to benefit completely from all the advantages accorded competing exporters from other countries.

Under current world economic conditions, exportation requires personal visits to the customer, and the sale of goods has become an art. From this standpoint, we are forced to bring our entire export system quickly to a contemporary state from the aspect of economic, administrative, and

marketing sciences. Changes in this direction made since 25 January 1980 have been significant, but are not sufficient. TUSIAD's proposals are, in summary:

1. Allow exporters to operate freely.
2. Require no permits for export goods.
3. Remove premiums collected from exportation.
4. Have the tax refund structure include subvention percentages equivalent to those of rival nations.
5. Establish a foreign-currency exchange.
6. Because export credit is insufficient today, establish a bank that specializes in this and that applies more rational measures.
7. Place export affairs under the authority of a single ministry.
8. Since studies on exportation are inadequate, conduct research on the topic.
9. Establish a Turkish foreign sales organization or office that has full authority.
10. Simplify foreign-exchange and foreign-trade formalities.
11. Accelerate the establishment of free export regions.
12. Introduce, with haste, export insurance with full coverage.
13. Begin to provide credit for Turkish exports to foreign purchasers.
14. Prepare to give Turkish foreign aid.
15. Set up a permanent export council that includes the public and private sectors.

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CSO: 4654/15



## INDUSTRIALISTS PUT EMPHASIS ON EXPORTS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 25 Sep 81 p 5

[Article by Muhsin Kufeli]

[Text] The goal of foreign sales, it is being pointed out to Turkish industrialists, is to become the means to emerge from the economic crisis we are experiencing and continues to hold validity.

Officials from several firms with whom we spoke say that, while they do not find the foreign sales they make adequate and while they plan to increase them in the years ahead, the long and short of it is that firms that are still not engaged in foreign sales must do so, that various goals can only be achieved by their doing so.

As an example, officials from Cemil Usta, a firm that manufactures machinery for the lumber processing industry, state, "We know that we are still new in this field. However, it is also true that there are opportunities to sell the goods we produce abroad. For example, we sold a veneer facing and joining machine to the United States for the first time. This was probably the first machine sold to the United States. The cost was only \$2,500, which is not much at this time, but selling machinery abroad is very important from the standpoint of our nation's industries." The same firm, this year, also received foreign exchange of 5,000 marks for a veneer facing, cutting, and sanding machine sold to West Germany; \$40,000 for five hydraulic veneer facing machines sold to Libya; \$40,000 for hinges sold to West Germany; and, most recently, \$82,000 for heat-preservation rocks sold to West Germany. In addition, talks with England are continuing.

CISAN [Cide Forest Products Industry and Trade Corporation] is another firm in the lumber industry branch that is directed toward foreign sales. By the end of the year, this company will have sold \$3 million worth of chipboard to Middle East countries. At this time, 70 percent of this amount has been delivered. Officials say that their goal is to reach \$50 million by the end of 5 years and report that they have reached an agreement with Egypt for 10,000 cubic meters of chipboard.

Arfen, a firm that manufactures exhaust fans, ventilators, and sirens, made foreign sales of \$1.5 million in the past 2 years and announces that its goal for this year is \$3 million. At present, 60 percent of its foreign sales are to Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and West Germany. Officials, who assert that its opportunities to sell fans used in barns to Germany in particular are great, state that they are working to find more markets abroad.

The Westerners Clothing Industry and Trade Corporation, a Pierre Cardin licensee that knows that it will not have much of a market within the country with the cost of a suit starting at 10,000 liras, is directed toward sales abroad. Okumus Holding Company, the parent company of this organization, which sells apparel to Middle East and some European countries, anticipates foreign sales of \$100 million with the addition of products such as bedding and upholstery material. Actual foreign sales at this time total \$55 million.

#### "Timid" Firms

In addition to the new and enterprising firms listed here and the large companies whose names have been on foreign-sales lists in the past, there are "timid," "shy" firms. A concrete example of this timidity is that an official of the company that immediately comes to mind when steel products are mentioned avoided telling the minister of industry at the opening of the Turkish Industrial Exhibition that his foreign-sales earnings are in the neighborhood of a million dollars.

The fact that a firm that manufactures motor vehicle rods and bears the motto, "On Foreign Markets," in its logo has not yet been able to make a foreign sale is another story.

To summarize, as far as can be seen, our industry, which is "bound to the hope of selling abroad," is suffering because it lacks marketing corporations that do business in the field of foreign sales. If, in spite of this deficiency, industrial goods surpass agricultural products in foreign sales for the first time this year, it is necessary to applaud the personal skills of our industrialists, who work in the face of all this to make foreign sales.

#### Export Explosion

In the meantime, at a meeting held yesterday, it was asserted that we cannot speak of a foreign-sales explosion when foreign exchange obtained from foreign sales is unable to meet that spent on foreign purchases.

Foreign Trade Secretary General Resat Erkmen gave the opening speech at the ISO [Istanbul Chamber of Trade] session, which was held to mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of Ataturk, on the topic, "Developments and Problems in Exportation." He said that the foreign-sales goal of \$3.5

billion that was placed in the program at the end of the year has been raised, and foreign sales will reach \$4.2 billion.

ISO administrative council member Mehmet Suhubi spoke later at the open session and said, in summary:

[1.] Until very recently, an "exporter" was one who exported traditional agricultural products. Now, exporters have reached the stage where they export goods whose value has been increased.

[2.] The exportation of industrial products must continue while work is carried out to avoid disturbing our own export-import balance.

[3.] No country in the world can engage in exportation with the exporter making a great deal of money. This is because exportation is a form of trading. A specific profit margin is sufficient.

[4.] There is no doubt that exportation is here to stay. However, no industrialist can live on exportation alone.

[5.] Every market is respected. Every market should be entered with the stipulation that the others not be abandoned.

In response to a question, Suhubi stated:

"In my opinion, it is difficult to speak of an export explosion, because we cannot do so when we are unable to meet import expenses with the money obtained from exports."

#### Industrial Products' Share in Foreign Sales

1965	19.6 percent	1976	30.3 percent
1970	23.6	1977	33.4
1971	25.8	1978	27.1
1972	30.6	1979	34.1
1973	33.6	1980	35.0
1974	39.0	1981*	48.0
1975	35.8	(*first half)	

The proportion of Turkey's industrial products in total foreign sales has gone up and down graphically in the past 10 years. However, this year for the first time, sales of industrial goods have caught up with sales of agricultural products and have exceeded them in recent months. It is difficult to say anything definitive about the continuation of this increase.

11673

C.O. 4-5-11

## COLUMNIST CITES PROBLEMS OF EXPORTS TO LIBYA

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 26 Sep 81 p 4

[Ertugrul Soysal column: "Beware of Exports to Libya"]

[Text] The orders which Libya made for imports of Turkish agricultural and industrial goods in November of 1980 and the spring of 1981 were enough to make your head spin. It is known that they exceeded \$500 million. Among the goods to be sold were orders of a size to meet the needs of the 3 million Libyans for years to come, such as \$600,000 worth of clothespins.

At a time when domestic market demand was as sharp as a knife and money had disappeared from sight, producers and exporting companies, taking their export incentives with them, leaped on our Libyan friends with unprecedented speed. Meanwhile, the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, which had opened its ground floor to the Libyan purchasing delegation in order to bring the parties together, displayed some strange sights: A heavyweight industrialist, seeking to demonstrate the sturdiness of his goods, mounted a small bicycle and pedalled around the purchasing room.

Be that as it may, no one knows how much of the more than \$500 million in orders have been exported without problems to Libya up to now, nor what amount of them have been paid for, but it is possible to list some of the adventures experienced by the exporters who, green order cards filled out from right to left in hand, had been patting themselves on the back prior to actually undertaking the export.

--The orders were on a cash against documents basis. The earliest money which arrived was received in 1 month, the 3 month payment delays which were considered normal at first, later increased to more than 6 months.

--Libya is unhappy over the packaging of Turkish goods; it is levying large claims (for reparations). However, all the foreign firms capable of performing insurance appraisals have been closed down. It is impossible to perform damage appraisals.

--The large majority of export vessels go to Tripoli. However, as the sales involve various towns, the goods are transported into the interior via the highways. Thus, internal transport risks constitute a large problem for the exporters.

--It is known that several of our firms are currently engaged in disputes with the Libyans.

--Damage risks are increased by the clumsy way in which transport and transshipment, loading and unloading are carried out.

--It is said that those whose orders are cancelled exaggerate the figures.

Actually, the purpose of this article is not to enter into the technical details of commercial dealings. The purpose is to describe plain, hard problems faced by a Turkish industry unprepared for exporting and Libya, not equipped with the infrastructure to absorb exports; this above and beyond their relations of friendship and sentiment.

Exporting is a matter involving knowledge, traditions, organization, service and competitive strength. We must be particularly careful in our commercial relations with Middle East countries. And we must not succumb to the laxness brought about by large orders and easily procured cheap state credits. Otherwise, such exciting slogans such as the export explosion or the "tourism explosion," more peculiar to the people of the East, will be overcome by the hard facts of the economy and of foreign competition.

CSO: 4654/40

## BUSINESSMAN UYAR ON TRADE WITH LIBYA, MUSLIM COMMON MARKET

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 8 Sep 81 p 8

[Text] It is claimed that, as America's economic relations with Libya are restricted to a degree, Libya will make use of Turkish firms in order to sell the oil it possesses.

Hisar Foreign Trade Director General Dr Kivilcim Uyar, who stated that it is likely that Turkish firms will cooperate closely with Libya on construction contracts in particular as well as in the area of petroleum, said, "The government must make changes in the related laws so that we will be able to sell or process Libya's oil. This topic has been placed on the agenda. However, our government must take the necessary measures without delay."

Uyar asserted that the level attained in relations between Turkey and the Islamic Arab nations and, in particular, Libya requires that Turkey's government become involved in the establishment of an Islamic common market. He went on, "Just because we say that, while we fight today to be able to join the EEC, we feel that efforts to form an Islamic common market of the same sort would produce more beneficial results does not mean that we want to cut off our relations with the EEC. However, bringing our neighboring and distant Islamic nations together and establishing a common market could be more successful from the standpoint of immediacy and from Turkey's standpoint."

Uyar defended the view that Turkey's intense efforts during the past few years directed toward the Middle East and the Islamic countries in particular have reached the point of producing results today. He said that Turkey now has very good relations with Arabs and Islamic states and that the Islamic nations can create a common market and, at the same time, foster development from Turkey's standpoint. The Hisar foreign trade director general stressed that the government must take the first steps on this issue and continued, "Only we can initiate an Islamic nations' common market. This enterprise begun today will have positive effects on Turkey and the economies of our fellow Islamic nations. We believe that the government will take the necessary measures on this topic."

### Cannot Sell Goods by Telex, Telephone to Libya

Uyar claimed that it is impossible to sell goods to Arab countries and to Libya in particular by telephone, telex, or mail. He said that Turkish exporters are inexperienced in this area and that it is for this reason that Turkey's exportation is not increasing at the needed pace. Uyar asserted that price and quality are considered important in the Islamic countries, that this is not going to change, and that Turkey fails to place the necessary importance on price and quality in its export products. One of the major reasons for this, he said, is that Turkish exporters do not know what world market prices are. He added, "In addition to price, quality also plays an important role. If you try to sell a refrigerator that is suitable in Turkey's climate to a Sahara Desert nation where the temperature is 45 degrees, you will sell it, but it will be sold at a very low price or will be returned as defective. Unfortunately, attention is not paid to these aspects, nor to quality and price."

### State Must Perform Consultant Service

A major problem confronting Islamic nations is consultant bureaus, Uyar stated, and all consultant services in Libya and other Islamic states are performed by British, Italian, and German firms. "Advising is a very important and very simple problem. Turkish-Libyan business relations should surpass Libyan-Italian relations. When we place a bid for a contract, we sit down at the bargaining table with the Libyans and with the British or whatever consulting firm is there. But, if we had a Turkish consultant firm in Libya, everything would be a great deal easier for us. This would facilitate Turkish firms' work abroad. However, the government must take an active part in setting up consultant services," he said.

Uyar stressed that the adoption of an export system modeled after that of South Korea or Japan is inescapable. He said that this type of system will ensure economy in expenditures as well as changes in profit margins and lowered cost prices for goods. Uyar stated, "In the South Korean model, 20 to 25 companies act as a corporation for exporting. However, because Turkish firms do not want to share their knowledge or their customers, they do not embrace such a model today. It will be seen in the future that all large organizations will be forced to employ this model."

11673

CSO: 4654/2



## FAHRI SCORES SINGLE-UNION CONCEPT

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 1 Oct 81 p 5

[Article by Mehmet Fahri]

[Text] Prior to the 12 September change in government, there were a number of organizations and institutions that did not perform their duties and even some organizations that misused their duties for evil purposes. It is true that the functions of several unions and unionists were also used for evil intentions. Strikes were directed toward sabotaging, under the guise of seeking rights, the economy of the business and the nation, and workers were dumped out onto the streets to clash with security forces. It is not possible to approve of any of this. It is imperative that the laws be amended so that these types of actions cannot occur again.

Furthermore, it is known that dues collected from workers in the past have been squandered by some unionists and that, for this reason, unionism has become a profitable profession. It is also a fact that has come out in the courts that some unions have spent the money taken out of their members' paychecks in places that have no relationship whatsoever with workers and have used it in ideologic activities.

The answer is to prevent workers' money from being spent in inappropriate places.

However, the way to do this is not through a single-union system. In our opinion, the single-union system, which does not give the worker the right to choose, cannot be a democratic union system.

We do not know, but we do not see any difference between a single-union system and a one-party system.

We believe that the single-union, single-confederation system violates the essence and spirit of the 12 September takeover, which is characterized as an action to protect and defend democracy.

We repeat. Abuse of rights must be prevented categorically. Unions must not become the plaything of this or that. Therefore, every sort of



amendment must be made. However, if we are to return to elections and a multiparty system in the future, the single-union system is not the path to take.

Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] will probably not oppose such a change, hoping to benefit from the advantage assured itself under the conditions that now exist. It might even support a change, because passage of such a law at this time would mean that there would be no confederation other than Turk-Is left in Turkey and no unions other than those affiliated with Turk-Is. Despite this, we believe that Turk-Is' support of a change in the law that introduces a single-union system would violate its own principles. That is, of course, if Turk-Is administrators were sincere when they said they are on the side of democracy.

In no democratic country in the world is there a single-party or single-union system.

Such a practice, which exists in Iron Curtain countries, which have absolutely no connection with democracy even though they say they are administered by democracy, cannot and must not serve as an example for a democratic nation such as ours. Such a practice would be a step backwards in democracy for us, not forward. It is also our sincere belief that this would harm, not benefit Turkey in the future.

In our opinion, rather than go to a single-union system, it would be better to close the unions and say that a commission will decide on specific wage increases each year and employers will provide the increases.

This is because, to say there is a single union is to say there is no union.

11673  
CSO: 4654/15

## TINDEMANS ON ELECTION ISSUES, FUTURE PROGRAMS

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS WEEKBLAD in Dutch 10 Oct 81 pp 9, 11

[Interview with Leo Tindemans, president of the CVP and former prime minister, by Pieter Nouwen and Jan Schils: "I Want To See if This Democracy Can Work"]

[Text] Even though he does not want to come right out and say it, Christian Democrat Leo Tindemans is preparing for a third prime ministership in a strife torn Belgium. In his opinion, Belgium will have to throw itself exclusively into a recovery of the collapsed economy. "I will have to find the ministers who, as a team, will want to make this come true."

In recent years, the country has primarily concerned itself with community problems, with the relationship between Flanders and Wallonia. The state reform act, which provided a wider autonomy for the two parts of Belgium, was passed under Prime Minister Martens. No provisions were made for the regulation of large industries, such as steel, which remained under the jurisdiction of the national government.

The Eyskens administration fell following a strike by the Walloon socialist ministers. They did not want to reform the Walloon steel industry, but wanted to continue receiving public money for it; a subsidy which would cost the Belgian state, until 1985, one-third of its budget. Following the elections on 8 November, a Christian democrat - liberal coalition is expected. The mere attempt to form such a government could lead to strikes and street violence in Wallonia. Leo Tindemans, prime minister in waiting, looks firmly forward to the future.

[Question] Opinion polls are predicting 20 percent blank ballots in the upcoming Belgian elections. Are the voters fed up with once again the same faces with mouths which say the same things?

[Answer] I believe that the problem is much more due to a lack of policy direction. The public feels that something has to change. People do not anticipate a change as in France, but they have the feeling that things will go wrong if they are allowed to continue on the present course. I am thinking here of matters such as the increased national debt, the deficit in the trade balance, the inflation which is going up again, and the uncertainty surrounding the currency.

To make decisions with regard to these problems has been made virtually impossible and the public feels this. In the end, you no longer dare to show yourself to the public. I regularly have to go talk to the people; as adults, they have a right to information. But you can't give them that information and then send them home in black defeatism. There is something missing there and that is a strong recovery policy.

[Question] In the recent past, there have been coalitions between the CVP [Social Christian Party - Flemish] and the socialists, and between the CVP, the socialists and the liberals. After the elections, a coalition between the CVP and the liberals is expected. Is this expectation well-founded?

[Answer] Unlike the Netherlands, electoral agreements are never made here. We will first have to wait and see whether relationships after the elections are not too different from the current ones. If this were not to be the case, then I don't think that, psychologically speaking, a three member national union of socialists, liberals and Christian democrats would be possible. There is the will in our country to arrive at a different policy. This calls for a different coalition.

[Question] In this respect, your preference goes to the liberals?

[Answer] There is no other possibility.

[Question] Are you willing to become prime minister of such a combination?

[Answer] Yes. But then with a program I can fully support. It cannot become a compromise. I myself will have to be happy with it. In summary, I can say that we should concentrate as dynamically and as energetically as possible on the economy.

[Question] Will you be prime minister of such an administration?

[Answer] I can't say anything about that right now.

#### Threat

[Question] In Wallonia they are going to try, under the leadership of the Socialist Party [PS] and of the socialist union, to prevent the formation of a Christian - liberal administration with all their might. In such a case, serious irregularities are expected there. What will you do then?

[Answer] I can be clear on this. One of the characteristics of fascism is that the citizens are afraid of a threat of violence. If the citizens in our democracy have to be afraid of violence, then that would be very serious, if we should have to accept so-called solutions because we are afraid of violence.

[Question] Do you consider the ability of a government to solve the Walloon steel problem a test for democracy?

[Answer] Yes. I want to see whether this democracy can work decently. Then it is obvious that majorities must be able to change a policy -- and it cannot be accepted that strikes, for example, would be able to prevent the formation of a government.

[Question] Even though Belgium is called a parliamentary democracy, the actual powers of the parliament are few. It is rather the party presidents and party committees which constitute the administration. Belgium is sometimes referred to as a "partyocracy." Can this go on?

[Answer] I myself was a victim of that partyocracy when I was questioned, in 1978, by four party presidents, including some from my own coalition, about a bill which had been declared unconstitutional by the Council of State. In my opinion, the cause of the degeneration of parliament lies with the socialists, who want to decide everything in the party committee -- which includes political leaders, the unions, the health insurance funds and other groups. There the positions to be taken in the Council of Ministers are determined, there new government projects are tested and there the position of the parliamentary party is determined. Afterwards, the parliamentary party always acts as a block in parliament, so that debates are no longer possible. The Council of Ministers has already decided; a parliamentary debate could break up the government agreement. Due to the whole system of previously entered into agreements, parliament is emasculated. We saw that last year with the handling of the state reform: parliament was not allowed to change even a letter or a comma in the bill, not even where the French and the Dutch did not coincide.

[Question] Getting back to Wallonia, your attitude will be very firm then in case of a threatened steel revolt.

[Answer] In December 1960, January 1961, we had a similar situation in Wallonia. At that time, we had the union leader Renard there. One may disapprove of him, but yet the man had a certain calibre. At the end of 1977 we had difficulties too. Now they are threatening to start up again; such a situation could occur again, which would not help Wallonia either.

The annoying part is that the CVP and the Flanders have accepted the steel plans. Now some people are saying that we want to ruin the steel industry. When I protest against this, then my statement is twisted by the BRT [Belgian Radio and Television - Dutch Service] news service so that my views never come through in Wallonia. As a matter of fact, the BRT sometimes does some strange things too. During a news broadcast, they once said: "This is what Mr Tindemans said; we have probably once again misunderstood him." It was a newsreader who said this.

I don't believe that all of Wallonia backs the movement (that of the Socialist Party and a number of Walloon unions: editor). People there are also convinced of the seriousness of the crisis and of the need to obtain new investments. I was in Liege recently for a speaking engagement. There were about 20 noisy demonstrators, but the audience turned against them.

Courage

[Question] What holds true for the Dutch Christen Democraten also holds true for the Belgian ones: they have been continuously in the center of power, sometimes governing with the left, other times with the right. Wouldn't it be healthy for the CVP to sniff the scent of the opposition benches for once?

[Answer] If all the items of our program are not adopted now, then we will not participate. We have to exert ourselves to maintain credibility. We have to have

people who are convinced by the program we are presenting to them. We have to have the courage to say: if that, that or that is not included, then we do not participate. Or let others make a proposal for a change.

We, the CVP, are not at the root of the current crisis. The last institution to still inspire authority, the government, is now being corroded by striking ministers. That is very serious for a country such as Belgium. The last shred of respect for that institution is being undermined this way.

[Question] Now that, in your opinion, democracy in Belgium is at stake, do you feel extra responsibility for the handling of things to come?

[Answer] I have no feelings of guilt. However, there is some... sensitivity, a feeling of irritation. I believe in the new economic policy. We have worked hard in our Research Center, and a choice of program was made which I agree with. No Thatcherism, no Mitterrand line for Belgium. What we do want to do is in the program. My mind and my psyche are such that I am now pleading with conviction for what has to be done and such that I want to campaign that way. I will intensify the making good of my convictions. I will have to find the ministers who, as a team, want to make this come true.

[Question] Can't you say something anyhow about the election program?

[Answer] We will have to work with greater dynamism at an economic recovery plan. At this point, the national debt is so large that, if our gross national product grows adequately during the next 1, 2 or 3 years, this growth will have to be used exclusively to pay off our foreign debt and to pay the interest on it. What we should strive for is a growth accompanied by exports, to increase the power of competition and to achieve a cost reduction for economic life. On the domestic market, foreign products surpass domestic products. The trade balance deficit is now 330 billion francs.

[Question] Isn't having enough time to develop a policy inherent to being able to solve the problems? This is especially true for Belgium, with its many cabinet changes.

[Answer] Indeed, this cannot be done in 1 year; actually, 4 years are even too short. One has to be able to plan in order to reduce national debts and to bring the budget down to reasonable proportions.

[Question] Not increase taxes then, but even more economizing?

[Answer] No, taxes should not be increased; rather, they should be decreased. There is a category of the population which is being taxed more and more, and which specifically forms a dynamic element. We call this category, using an ugly word taken from the French, cadre personnel. If this backbone were to be broken, this would be very serious for the country.

[Question] There is fairly often talk about conflicts within the CVP. The Martens-Tindemans relationship is supposedly not the best. Don't such internal difficulties stand in the way of a strict policy?



[Answer] The positions of the CVP with regard to government policy and the steel dossier are now unanimous. The program still has to be explicitly approved, but there won't be too many problems with that.

[Question] What is your opinion of the state reform as your predecessor Martens managed to get it passed? Opponents claim that it does more harm than good because it does not go far enough.

[Answer] Eyskens said: we have to turn it back or go even further. I agree with that. There is a saying in the Flanders: "My child, beautiful child." Those who pursued the restructuring will maintain that it was good. But it could have been predicted that it wouldn't work and the facts have proven that I was right.

[Question] It should, among other things, have provided a solution to the steel problem.

[Answer] For example. But the greatest danger to threaten us is that we will once again spend 90 percent of our energy and of our time on community problems, instead of throwing ourselves into the economic problems.

Misfortune

[Question] And yet, the question of what Belgium will look like constitutionally speaking will continue to occupy minds in the future. How do you see the course of that future?

[Answer] The question is what has to be regulated on a national basis and what on the basis of the regional states. The misfortune for this country lies in the fact that there have never been discussions between politicians and constitutional law experts. They have never quietly talked about it; it has always been a boxing match. The parties have always wanted to find something from their own party programs in the final government declaration. That is the Belgian tragedy. The state reform act was boxed through, pushed through, with the above mentioned parliamentary frustrations. Now, there is either no Council of Ministers or there are community difficulties and there is talk of a conflict of authority.

Now, the financing of the economy is the stake in a conflict, and two economic policies -- for some people, two economic models even -- are being proposed. The question is not being asked what a fatal influence such a course of events could have on the currency. Two economic models could also result in a fatal political split. There is a lot of shouting about "master in one's own house," but not a word is being said about the implications. A real conversation about it is not possible. Why isn't it possible to have a good talk about this among intelligent people? I detest the treating of the so-called federalism with slogans.

3463

CSO: 3105/17

## NO-CONFIDENCE VOTE FAILS, PARLIAMENT TURNS TO NEW BUSINESS

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 12 Sep 81 pp 1,4

[Text] The vote of no-confidence requested by the TKP [Communal Liberation Party] against the government headed by Prime Minister Mustafa Cagatay, the UBP [National Unity Party] chairman general, failed yesterday in the Federated Assembly. The no-confidence proposal was voted upon at the assembly meeting conducted by Federated Assembly Assistant Chairman Ekrem Ural. Deputies' names were read and their votes were taken orally. There were 19 votes in favor of the proposal and 17 votes against it. Under the constitution, a vote of no-confidence requires 21 votes, a simple majority of the total number of assembly members. In yesterday's vote, the 21 votes necessary were not obtained. Therefore, the no-confidence proposal of the TKP against the government led by Cagatay was rejected.

## Absent During Voting

Three deputies did not take part in the voting on the no-confidence proposal. DHP [Democratic People's Party] Deputy Ismet Kotak, who entered the general council hall immediately following the voting, reported that he could not follow the proceedings because the loudspeaker outside the hall was not working and did not participate in the voting for this reason. Kotak requested that his explanation be entered into the minutes. UBP Deputy Irsen Kucuk, who is minister of health, social affairs, and labor, was another deputy who did not vote. He was not present in the hall during the voting, but said that, had he been there, he would have voted against the proposal. He asked that this view be put into the minutes. The third deputy absent when the voting took place was UBP Deputy Mustafa Haci Ahmetoglu.

## Other Topics

Later, the Federated Assembly unanimously agreed to establish three committees to study the topics of motor vehicles that are brought onto the island with taxi and rental car permits, have not had legal operations completed, and continue to be used illegally; in parallel to this, reduced customs taxes imposed and import permits issued by other ministries, and

the failure to return to the country \$50 million received by the Turkish Cypriot Federated State for the exportation of lambs in the years 1976 through 1981. The committees will complete their work within 45 days at the most and will submit their findings to the assembly. After reading questions and answers, the Federated Assembly meeting was continued until 1030 hours, Tuesday, 15 September.

11673

CSO: 4654/5



## WALDHEIM'S INITIATIVE, 'IDEAS' ANALYZED

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 6 Oct 81 p 1

[Text] Waldheim's "ideas" are no longer a matter of conjecture. They are specific efforts with specific "compromise" proposals. The Cypriot government knows precisely the content of these ideas. Certain parties familiar with them reject this new initiative by Waldheim. The broad public does not know what they are. Although these new ideas have been published more or less in the newspapers, officially nothing has been said. And since officially they do not exist it is impossible for one to express any opinion, negative or positive.

This is one aspect. It refers to the acceptance or rejection of the new ideas as a solution to the Cypriot problem. This aspect is not for the present. However, another aspect is of immediate concern. Namely, whether these ideas, regardless of the final outcome, could form a basis for further discussions with the Turkish side. It is something entirely different for one to accept certain "ideas" as a solution and another to accept them for discussion. On this point there seems to be a kind of deliberate confusion.

We agree with the position that we should not reject without discussion any initiatives for the solution of the Cypriot problem. Nor should we discourage them in advance by taking a negative stand.

We have explained in detail this view several times before so that only political idiocy or deliberate narrow-mindedness could distort it or misinterpret it. The explanation is simple: Every time we rush to say directly or indirectly, openly or with hints, "no" to such initiatives, we play into the hands of the Turks. The Turks take their time, while they take advantage of our ill-considered haste. Not only that. The Turks know that every stalemate consolidates the fait accompli.

Let us see how things stand at this moment. Waldheim, with encouragement from the West and silent acquiescence from the East, presented his "ideas." He knows, and we know, that those ideas can move forward only if they are accepted as a basis for discussion by both the Turks and the Greeks. If one side says "no" behind the scenes, then his initiative will not come to light since it will be doomed to failure in advance. What then are the alternatives.

If the Turks say that the "ideas" are unacceptable and that they do not consider them a basis for discussion, the initiative ends right there. The same would

happen if we said "no." But should the Turkish side say "yes" while we say "no," then we have a serious problem. This problem has two aspects. The first refers to preventing the initiative and formally ending the discussions. The second refers to the propagandistic and diplomatic utilization of a "yes" at the expense of the "no."

There is already on the Greek side an expressed view that Waldheim's new initiative should be averted by any means. The reasoning is that if it is allowed to come to light, the "no" we are going to say afterwards will be against us because it will be utilized by the Turks. We believe that this view is very superficial. The Turks, one way or another, have an interest in our saying "no." Our "no" favors the fait accompli. At the same time, it discourages all those who have contributed to the initiative of the UN secretary general. Therefore, a "no" to the discussion of the ideas, under whatever conditions, would be a mistake. Discussion does not mean acceptance. It simply means a proof by deed that we are in favor of an effective dialogue.

We argued extensively, by means of analyses and reasoning, that the rejection of the Anglo-American Plan was an erroneous decision. A rejection of the new ideas as a basis for discussion would be a fatally wrong position. The known facts and all the indications regarding the new Waldheim initiative show that this is a very serious effort with the participation of the West and possibly of the East as well.

This column believes that any initiative from whatever quarter must be discussed, and more so when it is embraced and presented by the secretary general of the United Nations whom we urged not long ago to show more active interest. Of course, President Kyprianou said that the question will be discussed at the ministerial level and the national council before a decision is reached. But he will have discussions in New York. His discussions there and his stand there will determine a lot of things. We seem to put the cart before the horse. What should have been done? These "ideas" should have been discussed here and the views of these bodies forwarded to New York. When President Kyprianou holds discussions, he should know the views of the parties here and their reasoned positions. Let us not hear that those here do not know the content of those "ideas." They know it. And it is their responsibility to decide whether the "ideas" form basis for discussion. We do not wish to anticipate developments. But our experience tells us that we are again facing impulsive or amateurish actions. The cyriot problem is at a truly critical juncture.

7520  
CSO: 4621/21

## PARTY CONGRESSES REVEAL PROGRESSIVE, RADICAL STRATEGIES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Sep 81 p 2

[Article by Lasse Ellegaard]

[Text] The national congresses of the Radical Liberals and the Progressives were quite uneventful in the sense that no concrete possibilities for new political constellations were established. But there were signs that the Radical Liberals are moving to the right and the Progressives are moving to the left.

The political landscape of Denmark was not changed much by the two congresses held last weekend--the Radical Liberal congress in Alborg and the Progressive congress in Herning.

The Radicals are still supporting the government and the Progressives are still isolated to the right of the Liberals and the Conservatives.

Even so--there were new tendencies at the Radical congress in the direction of a more open attitude toward the Liberals and Conservatives. Several delegates took the opportunity to stress that "the Radicals are liberals" and in that connection Asger Baunsbak Jensen's comeback in Radical politics has made an impression on the two nonsocialist opposition parties. Baunsbak Jensen is a former national chairman of the Radical Liberals (1971-75) and an education director. Now he has become a pastor in Kokkedal and politically active again, as shown by his election to the Radical executive committee with the second largest number of votes, 266. His remarks from the rostrum that "it's too easy to crawl into bed with the Radicals"--meaning for the government--were greeted with a burst of applause and were taken as a sign of an opening up toward the right.

Liberal leader Henning Christophersen told us that "Baunsbak's remarks about the ties to the Social Democrats were quite interesting" and that he--Christophersen, that is--"had noticed mounting concern among Radical Liberal members about this connection." But Christophersen found nothing new in the views expressed by Radical leaders at the congress, "but for the first time in 4-5 years we heard something resembling an approach to the line Baunsgaard represented as Radical leader," added Henning Christophersen, "and it is encouraging that it was a prominent Radical, namely Baunsbak Jensen, who expressed it."

At the congress the Radicals said they would not go along with the Social Democrats and the other two compromise parties, the Christian People's Party and the Center Democrats, to cover the extra cost of defense spending. It remains the Radical view that a separate income compromise must be reached with the participation of the two nonsocialist parties when the bill has to be paid for the defense agreement.

Niels Helveg Petersen stressed at the congress that V [Liberal Party] and K [Conservative Party] must abandon their present negative attitude toward the economic policy. He argued that a nonsocialist government depending on the support of the Progressives cannot work and that the two nonsocialist parties can exert influence only via cooperation with the government and the compromise parties.

"As long as the Social Democrats have a majority of 90 seats with the small support parties V and K cannot have any major influence," said Henning Christophersen, "for why would the government include us in a coalition? That would require even more concessions."

Henning Christophersen continued: "I have noted Niels Helveg Petersen's request but it would have been more interesting if the Radicals had made it a condition that V and K should be included in compromise talks if the Radicals are to participate in economic policy. But such a condition was not mentioned in Niels Helveg Petersen's speech."

### Three-Party Government Desired

The Progressive congress was considerably more entertaining than that of the Radicals--at least according to reports. The essence of the congress was the appeal of the Progressives to V and K for closer cooperation, preferably government cooperation after the next election. Of course Mogens Glistrup had to remark that Poul Schluter and Henning Christophersen "would be worse to have alone in a government than Anker Jorgensen" but the drift of the meeting's main debate was clear enough, the intention is to put pressure on the two big nonsocialist parties to go along with the Progressive Party in a "nonsocialist government alternative."

The Conservatives categorically rejected a VKZ [Liberal-Conservative-Progressive] coalition at its national council meeting a few weeks ago. Poul Schluter ruled out the idea as politically unrealistic and Henning Christophersen told the weekend edition of BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that such a government "couldn't work." He pointed out that the party's political spokesman, Uffe Thorndal, has said in the press that it should not be a condition for cooperation that the Progressive Party be given cabinet posts. "The party is driving along two tracks with the same train and perhaps it ought to decide which track suits it best. Right now it is as if it is two parties in one," the Liberal chairman declared.

One of the more concrete details at the congress was the announcement of an independent immigration policy. The party wants all immigrants expelled from the country "if they can't manage by themselves." Their rights to vote and run in municipal elections should be revoked along with their special school programs.

In the entertaining segment there were several "warm embraces" of Social Democrat Mogens Camre.

## LIBERAL PARTY CONGRESS PRESENTS ECONOMIC PROGRAM

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Sep 81 p 10

[Text] The Social Democratic policy is leading Denmark directly to the economic brink and the very next step is national bankruptcy. This was the message of Liberal chairman Henning Christophersen yesterday at the party's national congress in Herning. He presented 16 points for a program providing an alternative to the current government.

## Debt of 130 Billion

"We are thoroughly tired of listening to the government's constant attempts to explain away the true reasons for the economic crisis. We are also very tired of hearing the false and frightening allegation that there is no alternative. And thirdly we are very tired of hearing the Progressive Party's constant attacks on the Liberals and the Conservatives. The issue is very simple: unless the Social Democrats change their policy they must assume responsibility for a development that will lead in the end to the brink of disaster and beyond to national bankruptcy," said Henning Christophersen in his welcoming speech at the Liberal national congress.

He underlined the economic situation's gravity in this way: "Last year the domestic national debt rose to 96 billion kroner. This year it will climb to 130 billion. Next year it will go up to 185 billion kroner. And if this development continues for just 2 more years we will have a domestic national debt of well over 300 billion kroner by 1984. Every time the country wants to spend 2 kroner it will have to borrow 1. The foreign debt also continues to grow. This year it will increase to 110 billion kroner. Next year to at least 125 billion kroner. In 1983 to at least 140 and at the end of 1984 it will exceed 160 billion kroner."

## Joint Liberal-Conservative Proposals

Henning Christophersen found cooperation with the Conservatives natural and necessary. "It will be incomprehensible for the voters if it does not also have some practical expression in the form of joint proposals," he said. Henning Christophersen also stressed that the door should be kept open for cooperation with the Center Democrats, the Christian People's Party and the Radical Liberals and he revealed at the congress that the Liberals had had such contacts with the three parties.

## Sixteen-Point Program

Henning Christophersen presented a 16-point government program for a nonsocialist alternative. The program contains demands for lower interest, equilibrium in the balance of payments and a steadily declining deficit in the national budget. The goal is the establishment of 140,000 new jobs in the private sector, public savings of 20 billion kroner over a 4-year period and business tax relief amounting to 6 billion kroner. The program also contains proposals for changes in the daily compensation system and the assistance law, cancellation of the wage-earners' cost-of-living fund, a ban on exclusive agreements and reinforcement of free and private schools.

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## LIBERAL PARTY MUST ACT ON CONGRESS DECLARATION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Sep 81 p 12

[Editorial]

[Text] Government cooperation between the Social Democrats and the Liberals was a desperate attempt to give the country a regime that could pursue the right policy. It was an experiment that failed utterly. When the year was over the Liberals gave as the reason for the failure that the Social Democrats did not have the necessary energy. The accuracy of that description has been more than confirmed in the 2 years that have gone by since then.

The Social Democrats have ruled alone since 1979, keeping themselves going with the help of the small support parties who no longer believe that their help can take care of the government's problems. The stormy debate in the last few days over pension funds is just one more example of the fact that the government is having an increasingly difficult time reaching agreement with the support parties. The government is about to run down. It is on the verge of collapse even before the new parliamentary year begins.

It is in this situation that the Liberal Party is proclaiming from its congress that it is the party that will organize the broad political cooperation needed for an alternative to be credible. It will be based on the close fellowship with the Conservative Party, a fellowship that will open itself to the parties that must in the months ahead decide whether they can defend a policy of shoring up the government. As prime minister Anker Jorgensen has demonstrated through the years that he will try to retain government power in the face of all adversity. He would rather violate his own policy than become part of the opposition. And he would rather abandon real solutions in order to be allowed to continue. It will therefore be decisive for the fate of the government if the Liberals and Conservatives have the determination and courage to formulate and maintain a policy that will make them seem strong enough to the voters to shoulder a new government. It will be a question of the credibility of the alternative and many voters can still recall the trust there used to be in Erik Eriksen as the creator of the fellowship that could replace the worn-out Social Democracy.

This is the task the Liberals must take up and carry out if the country is to get another government. The collapse of the Social Democrats will not be enough to

provide a basis for the breakthrough of the nonsocialist alternative as the power factor of the future. The Liberals and Conservatives will betray the country if they are unable to handle this job. One does not become stronger because others become weaker. One becomes stronger only through one's own efforts.

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## BRIEFS

LIBERALS INCREASING MEMBERSHIP--The Liberal Party, already Denmark's most strongly organized party, has had another big jump in membership figures. Party secretary Kurt Sorensen said yesterday at the Liberal congress that the membership campaign that was launched in 1981 has produced 7700 new members so far, a net gain of 3500. As of 31 December 1980 the Liberal Party had 92,845 members and it is estimated that the membership drive that will continue for the rest of the year will bring the figure up to around 100,000 by New Year's. That's the biggest gain the Liberals have had in the 30 years that have gone by since the general membership decline for political parties began. The Liberals have an organization percentage of 23.41. In comparison the Social Democrats have an organization percentage of 9. The Liberal Party has 1017 voter associations, an average of almost four in each municipal district. No other party has so many voter associations. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Sep 81 p 10] 6578

CSO: 3106/6

## BRANDT GIVES VIEWS ON NORDIC 'ZONE,' POLAND, DETENTE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Oct 81 Part II pp 1-2

[Interview with Social Democratic Party chairman Willy Brandt by Niels Norlund in Bonn; date not specified]

[Text] After 35 Years

Bonn--On his first day as foreign correspondent in occupied Germany, in August 1945, Niels Norlund met Norwegian journalist Willy Brandt representing ARBEIDER-  
BLADET. They met on the train going to the British press headquarters in Herford and they went on from there in style in a British general staff car to Nuremberg where the big war crimes trial was coming to a close. Norlund went on from there to Berlin as a correspondent and Brandt turned up soon afterward in the capital of the occupying forces acting as press attache with the Norwegian military mission with the rank of major. They experienced the Berlin crisis together, the years that led to Willy Brandt's decision to give up his Norwegian citizenship and become a German again in order to help restore German democracy. While Norlund left Berlin after the blockade to pursue his career as journalist elsewhere in the world, Willy Brandt began an admirable career as the leader of the new Germany who made his mark in German politics as the man with the most courage, daring and humanity. Over the years international events made it possible for the statesman and the journalist to renew an old professional friendship at intervals. Ten years ago Norlund interviewed Willy Brandt when he was chancellor of the Federal Republic in Bonn. This week he visited him in the party chairman's beautiful and elegant office in Erich Ollenhauer Haus, the most modern Social Democratic Party headquarters, where Brandt pays tribute to his political forebears with portraits of Jean Jaures, August Bebel and Rosa Luxemburg. And very naturally the conversation became retrospective.

## A Life for Germany

[Question] It was very much on your mind back in 1946 that Germany must not orient itself onesidedly in relation to "die Siegermaechte," must not take sides in the growing conflicts between the allies, must not try to play them against each other. Now things went otherwise--as you also feared. Developments forced the Germans to take sides, first with the Berlin blockade and then with FRG's membership in NATO. Looking back, do you now feel the Germans share responsibility

for the division of Germany into two states? Did they involve themselves too quickly against the East or the West? Or could they have counteracted the division of Germany? Were there adequate opportunities to win them over?

[Answer] I don't know if someone who was also involved in all that can give an entirely valid and definitive answer to that question. There was nothing wrong with the concept I had but it was based on the assumption that the cooperation among the victorious powers would continue and that turned out to be incorrect. In the Berlin crisis one could only defend one's own interests and do so along with those who had the power to defend us. And I don't really believe there was any way around the formation of a West German state. A German co-responsibility--yes, Hitler Germany had created the situation that brought the Russians as far as the middle of Germany or, if you like, that brought both sides into Germany so that the line dividing Germany became the place where the two world powers met, of course we must share the responsibility there.

Point Number 101

[Question] You're talking about the old Germany, not the present one.

[Answer] A few days ago I had a talk with my friend Bruno Kreisky, chancellor of the Austrian republic, and we discussed once more the events preceding the Austrians' "Staatsvertrag," as we call it, which was in reality their peace agreement of 1955. At that time we in Germany asked ourselves if a similar construction wouldn't be possible for Germany too. Kreisky said he asked Mikoyan and Schaerff, who was then vice chancellor, asked others even higher up in the Russian hierarchy and the Russians informed them clearly at the time that there was no Austrian solution for Germany. It had to do with our location, our size, our strategic importance, not just the strategic position but also the economic one.

I myself had not long after 1955, maybe 2 years later, a long talk with John Foster Dulles who told me that even if America and Russia differed on 100 points they would still agree on the 101st--they were not interested in having a Germany that was united, neutral and armed, with the inherent dangers this would pose. So even after the war cooperation broke down and Europe was divided, as expressed most strongly in the division of Germany and the division of Berlin on top of that, people in both East and West did not feel that solution was possible. So I don't think German policy could have influenced things in a substantially different direction from the one we have seen.

[Question] But right around 1955 your party voted against rearming Germany as well as against the Paris agreements allowing Germany to join NATO. Was this based on a wish, a hope, that there might be an Austrian solution anyway?

[Answer] It was based on the idea that not enough of an effort had been made to pursue things all the way to find out if there was a possibility after all. No one can know for sure but I don't think there was and after a certain point the German Social Democrats also took the consequences of this.

[Question] You yourself have done more than anyone to overcome onesidedness in Germany's European policy with your "Ostpolitik" which led to your "Ostvertraege" with Poland and the Soviet Union and further to the Berlin arrangement and even further to the Helsinki agreements. Has that development come to an end? Was it the European peace settlement following World War II? Was it something that could be done at the beginning of the 1970's--but then it was over? Or do you still see further prospects?

[Answer] I don't know what development possibilities exist but I would agree that there is an interest in not allowing things to remain where they are now. We tried to make it clear then that we are a loyal member of the western cooperation in Europe and the Atlantic cooperation with the United States, but we want to normalize our relations with our eastern neighbors to the extent this is possible. In a way it was because we wanted to achieve some equality with our neighbors. We wanted to speak for ourselves in both Moscow and Warsaw and in the other capitals as our allies had been able to do. That was one element in it. We also wanted to see if we could reduce some of the most unfortunate effects of the division--with regard to communications between people in the different parts of Germany, with regard to the transfer of people of German origin not only from Poland but also from the Soviet Union--and quite a bit has been accomplished there. Even in the somewhat inflamed situation we have had for the last few years there has been more contact among divided family members than there was in the first two decades after the war. And there we have a continued German interest that is also an economic interest.

In addition there is something even more important. In a divided Europe where conflicts sometimes escalate between world powers and between alliances Germany with its two parts is the area in the world that has the biggest stockpile of instruments of destruction. There is a latent German anxiety that the situation might explode and that we would be the first to be affected and perhaps be the ones most severely hurt. This emotional reaction lies behind a great deal of what is called the "peace movement."

We can't exclude the possibility that there will be a new situation in which the big powers will make certain agreements in their own interest. If that happens, I'm not saying it will now, but if it happens it would give us a whole new point of departure. That was precisely the situation in 1970. Then America and Russia were negotiating the first SALT agreement and we were interested in easing ourselves into such a movement and getting as much out of it with respect to our own interests as we reasonably could.

Poland

[Question] Polish developments in the 10 years that have gone since 1970 and especially in the 11th year, which you call the inflamed year, are in a way a function of the German-Polish treaty which opened up a broad economic cooperation between Germany and Poland, thus making a more independent Polish line possible. How do you regard the events in Poland last year? If they manage to keep their balance will this point the way toward greater independence for the individual East European countries?

[Answer] We didn't try in any way to create problems for any of our neighbors. But it is probably true that when we removed the anti-German card from the game for East Europe it created greater opportunities for movement. When we and others led developments up to Helsinki it provided a basis for the groups and in some places like Poland even movements that could refer to what was intended to be a framework for European cooperation outside the alliances. Of course there have been illusions connected with Helsinki. I'm not saying that for the first time now. I said it then. The communist leaders who signed at Helsinki naturally did so on the basis of a different interpretation of the content of the final document. They weren't signing anything with the idea that it would lead to the end of communist rule in their countries.

One must be careful not to overestimate the contribution one's own policies, whether German or western policies, has made. We are talking about a historical process in which the peoples between Germany and Russia are in a way regaining their identities. This occurs in various ways and as we have seen it is a painful process but it is no doubt something that has history on its side.

Poland has been extremely moving for us, that a labor movement of an entirely new kind is making its mark and demanding its special rights. Of course even before the workers began to articulate themselves last summer Poland deviated from the conditions of government in a number of the other countries, such as East Germany. The church had a very different kind of influence and had arrived at a kind of arrangement with the political regime. Intellectual life had many more nuances than was customary in other lands under communist rule. It was as if the starting point there was different.

It is hard to say how long this can continue. It would be an illusion to believe that there is a way for Poland to get out of the military organization to which the country belongs. But one can question if the surveys of the balance of forces between East and West that we work with are actually realistic today when they count a certain number of Polish divisions as part of the Warsaw Pact. I am concerned at the moment because the various mainstreams seem to be having a harder time than before in finding a kind of balance. On the other hand I have a hard time believing even now that the Russian leaders are considering a military intervention. That would mean assuming a colossal burden and I don't mean by that the burden it would mean from many other points of view. We are keeping a very close eye on things but we, and I myself as well, have done what we could to make it clear that we don't want to interfere. It's so easy to use strong words and shout hurray when they do something. But in reality we can't do much except keep co-operation going and help out wherever we can. It is not generally known that of all nations--with the exception of the Soviet Union which is in an entirely different position--none has been more involved with Poland than the Federal Republic when it comes to credits, including credits that can't be realized.

[Question] I'm going to jump back here; I was there in Warsaw in 1970, in the ghetto a few meters away from you when you fell on your knees in front of the Jewish memorial. I have often wondered whether that was a spontaneous gesture. It was one of the most moving experiences I have had since the war...but was it spontaneous or was it something you had planned?



[Answer] Yes and no! I knew the morning I left the castle where they had put me up that I must do something more than just lay a wreath. But the exact form it took came out of the situation itself.

[Question] When you talk of the opportunity of European people to regain their identity in the historic process do you think the Polish situation will have a backlash in the long run because the Soviet Union will feel it necessary to tighten up discipline as soon as this becomes possible again?

[Answer] I don't hope so.

[Question] You visited Brezhnev this summer....

[Answer] At that time I didn't get the impression that the Russian leadership was prepared to intervene directly. But one does not need to go to Moscow to imagine how frightful this is viewed through Russian eyes. It is a challenge of their entire idea of how a state should be ruled but it is also an additional challenge that individuals want to be seen as independent units and not just as partial elements in a large nation.

[Question] I was not just thinking of tightening discipline with a military intervention now but in the political dominance over East Europe later on. But of course that can only be a speculation.

[Answer] It can only be a speculation. It isn't just a question of what one wants. It is also a question of what one is capable of doing.

Nordic Region

[Question] You came out of the talks with Brezhnev with an apparently optimistic view of the possibilities in the proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone. At any rate you got the Nordic governments going. But at the moment things seem to have fizzled out. Weren't the talks in Moscow and those with Gromyko in New York last week negative?

[Answer] I think too much was read into what I actually said, after I came back from Moscow. I had thought of asking what the Russians meant by a nuclear-free zone because Brezhnev had just had this interview with a Finnish newspaper right before I came, on a Saturday I think, and I arrived on Monday. I was ready to ask about it but he brought it up himself in his first presentation of the problems. He said he assumed I was still interested in what went on in the Nordic region. And of course I am because I lived there so long. But since he was the one who brought it up I could limit myself to a supplemental remark. I said if there was to be any basis to such a concept it would be inconceivable unless a corresponding Russian area was involved. And I got the impression then that they thought this was a reasonable point of departure.

But I agree with the conclusion you started out with: it does not appear that what they were thinking of can be a realistic point of departure for the Scandinavian lands, especially considering the differences in the military status of the various Nordic countries.

[Question] Now it is being said in the Nordic region that a nuclear-free zone for us can only be contemplated in a broader European context. But is it really realistic to imagine that one can neutralize a substantial part of Europe from nuclear warfare in the event of a major European conflict?

[Answer] It may be a little hard to imagine now. On the other hand, Denmark and Norway which have always been in NATO have had a somewhat different status than the others with respect to nuclear weapons. It is not the same as a nuclear-free zone, of course. But what do I know? In principle I can't rule out the possibility that future developments could include different arrangements in the various regions, but I don't see anything like this happening right away.

Party

[Question] You're 67 years old now...

[Answer] Yes!

[Question] ...and by Danish standards you're ready for Social Security. But you act as if you're getting younger and younger.

[Answer] I even draw a little old age insurance. I got that when I turned 65.

[Question] You have been retirement age for 2 years already but you seem younger both in your views and in part of your lifestyle. It seems as if you are much closer to the left wing of your party than you were when you were chancellor. Is that because you can permit yourself to change your mind on issues more now that you are not responsible for ruling the country? Is it because you alone are responsible for the party and want to keep it together?

[Answer] When one becomes chairman of a party one is not just concerned with keeping it together mechanically. If one takes charge of a party one would like to have it live whether or not one is in the government. I say that as one who is very interested in having the party remain in power. But it isn't just the mechanical idea of holding it together. If one works with a party in the midst of a transformation process as my party is, ideologically and sociologically, both at the same time, one gets close to some of the critical ideas that have been put forth and one discovers they aren't all that crazy. Take for example the ecological movement, we have already seen that there is more to it than many people originally wanted to concede. For that matter I myself took some of these topics up 20 years ago, so to some extent I am just going back to something I was concerned with much earlier. I said at a congress in 1960 that the skies over the Ruhr should be blue again. There were some who believed I was promising heaven on earth but that was not really the case. The sky has become lighter. If one talks to a Lufthansa pilot who knows Germany from the air better than others do a great deal has been accomplished there. But that was a preliminary to the beginning discussion of the quality of our economic development. There is a lot in that.

Or take those who call themselves the "peace movement." When one is in the government one might be annoyed because they are making important things and necessary things more difficult and may be causing problems in our relations with the Americans--or whatever. When you don't have that immediate burden you think as I do: you have experienced worse things in your life than young Germans becoming involved on the side of peace and arms reduction. When they do so, even if they are onesided, even if they act in an exaggerated way, even if there is often a lack of realism in it, you have a chance to talk with them. I see it at my meetings now. I have a lot of young people. Most of them probably think I am far too cautious but still I try to listen to what they have to say.

That is one side of it. The other is that after having gone through an illness I actually feel healthier, I take more time for myself and don't get quite as absorbed in desk work. I go home from a meeting after 12 hours have elapsed even if it is a meeting of the presidium of my own party. When it gets to be 9 or 9:30 I say goodbye and express a wish that the meeting comes to a good conclusion. I go home and lie down. Well I don't really lie down, I go home and drink a glass of wine and read. So there are various factors that are working together.

[Question] What you have said there, does that mean you would refuse the job if the post of chancellor became vacant again?

[Answer] Well, now, you said "if it becomes vacant;" usually I answer that we already have a chancellor and we don't need two.

[Question] But they are saying that Helmut Schmidt is considering his position and he directly threatened to resign over the missile issue.

[Answer] And the other question won't come up. I should probably keep going with the party a little longer but I actually have a number of interests that could keep me busy fulltime. This concerns Europe. It concerns utilizing the contacts one has in various parts of the world. I have worked intensively for a couple of years on what they call North-South. So I don't lack things to work on. If we come into a phase where the chief of state needs a successor I would tend to go in the direction of a younger man. We need that in several areas in my party and perhaps elsewhere in German politics.

#### Coalitions

[Question] If we look back at the form of government hasn't it promoted continuity and moderated extreme positions in German politics that you have almost always had coalition governments in the Federal Republic? Would you have preferred to be chancellor with a straight Social Democratic government or was it actually useful that you had a liberal coalition partner to take into account?

[Answer] I don't know if I could make an absolute general rule out of this but in my time it was an advantage in many ways. And I did have a little experience to start with. I was mayor of Berlin for 10 years and being mayor there is not just a municipal position. One had some of the same tasks a German regional



leader had and there was also some foreign policy connected with the job. I had my best election result at the beginning of 1963 with an almost two-thirds majority for my party. I said before the election that even if we got a clear majority I would not form the Senate, as we say there of regional governments, without support and if the Free Democrats wouldn't join us I would take some unaffiliated union people in because I didn't want people to confuse a Senate meeting, as cabinet meetings are called there, with a party leadership meeting. With all due respect to party leadership meetings. In my time I regarded it as an advantage to put together something that had to come together out among the people anyway.

There was an Austrian president after the war, Karl Renner, who came up with the theory that coalitions are an advantage in our time with the problems inherent in the industrial society. There are differing opinions of that. Kreisky did not share that view.

[Question] If you had had a clear majority in the national days would you have continued the coalition?

[Answer] I don't think I would have had any partners on that. My own party would not have cared for the idea. It is always, well maybe not always, but often the case that when one has a majority one wants to utilize it at least on the personal political level if for nothing else. But the Free Democrats have for some time been opposed and still are to joining a party that has a majority on its own. The big coalition which had some justification for us in a period from 1966 to 1969 had come to a point where it could not very well continue. I would not want to present my viewpoint as a generally valid rule, I only want to say that my own experience goes in the direction of saying that sometimes it is not only useful but a definite advantage for two parties to join forces. I say two because we have fewer parties than you do.

[Question] If you won a clear majority would your own party expect a more uncompromising socialist policy?

[Answer] That is quite possible and there can also be points where this would be justified or understandable. But there are areas in politics nowadays that can't be influenced. Take our budget, for example, where we now arrive at compromises with the liberals. Aside from a very few points similar corrections would have been necessary even if the Social Democrats had been ruling alone.

#### Future

[Question] Can you see far enough into the future to envision a much closer cooperation between the two Germans?

[Answer] If, as we say in German, "die Grosswetterlage" become somewhat more favorable than in the last few years it might be possible to deal with some of the practical things that have had to wait. Even now contacts are all right. A conversation between Schmidt and Honecker is possible when Brezhnev has been here. Some practical things can be done even though the financial situation sets limits.

But I would have to be able to see a long way into the future to imagine a really new relationship, not just an arrangement. This would have to be a time when relations between the two parts of Europe have really changed. I think it is quite likely that this will change unless a great misfortune occurs in the meantime. We touched on this when we talked about the historical process in the lands lying between Germany and Russia. That is something that lies in the future. But if there is a greater degree of cooperation between the parts of Europe lying on one side and the other it will provide a background that could give the two German states an opportunity to arrange their relations in a new way. I am not talking about a revival of Bismarck's national state. I am not at all sure that that will be the answer. But within the framework of true European cooperation extending beyond the present division of the continent it could be--for example in the cultural area--that the two German states could have an even higher degree of cooperation than the others have. But that belongs to the future.

[Question] That would almost presume the recession of the confrontation in Europe between the two great powers from the European continent.

[Answer] It would have to be absent altogether.

[Question] And that's a long way off?

[Answer] That is a long way off.

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## PROFILE OF GIANNIS ALEVRAS PUBLISHED

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek No 688, 8-14 Oct 81 p 11

[Text] Giannis Alevras, PASOK's parliamentary spokesman since the first session of the legislature following the fall of the dictatorship, fought daily for 7 long years PASOK's battles from the forum of the Chamber of Deputies.

A fighter, consistent and methodical, always armed with irrefutable data and arguments, caustic but always objective, he disarmed and often left his opponents speechless.

Giannis Alevras, together with PASOK's parliamentary group, gave a new dimension to the role of opposition which expresses in the legislature a broad popular movement for basic, structural and institutional changes. He was not satisfied with an opposition to the government, but in every instance presented with his customary clarity PASOK's theses on all the major social, economic and political problems of this country, offering sound and constructive proposals.

The elevation of the legislature as democracy's basic institution—as PASOK considers it and as PASOK Chairman Andreas G. Papandreu said recently in Giannina—became a reality with the parliamentary struggles of Giannis Alevras and of the PASOK parliamentary group.

Alevras' parliamentary contribution, which has been recognized even by his opponents, is the culmination of a long fight for democracy which started in 1935 when for the first time, very young, he went to jail because of his democratic beliefs. Without credentials of wealth or family origin, working at the Bank of Greece he rose, thanks to his honesty and diligence, to become a high official. He readily understood that the problems of the working people cannot be solved except by hard struggle. He took a leading part in syndicalist fights for many years and was elected for a number of years president of the Bank of Greece Employees' Association.

In 1955 he organized the Federation of Greek Bank Employees' Organizations [OTOE] and for several years was elected to its presidency. In recognition of his struggles and his significant contribution to the Greek banking employees, he was named lifelong honorary president of OTOE. His fighting spirit and abilities soon exceeded the limits of the banking area. The first irreconcilable fight found him at the head of the strongest Greek syndicates.

Appreciating his contribution to the fight and his fighting spirit, Georgios Papandreou recruited him to offer his services in the Chamber of Deputies. In the 1963 and 1964 elections he was elected among the top candidates in competition with other much stronger members on the party's slate in Athens.

On 15 July 1965, in the royal coup, the forerunner of the military dictatorship, Giannis Alevras emerged as a top, close associate of Andreas Papandreou...next to him, side by side, to set off for the "Second Irreconcilable struggle," to give for the first time the true meaning to the social liberation struggle of the Greek people.

Thanks to his struggles, Giannis Alevras is given "special treatment" by the dictatorship. He was arrested the night of the coup and taken to Goudi as a "hostage," together with Georgios and Andreas Papandreou. This was the "first station" in a long series of imprisonments, banishments, arrests and of course constant interrogations and violence by the Greek Military Police [ESA] and Security. But even under those conditions Giannis Alevras found the way to organize and direct resistance to the junta. Among the founding members of PASOK he was elected first deputy in the First Athens District in the elections of 1974 and 1977.

Giannis Alevras, the "iron guts" of the Chamber of Deputies, with tremendous expertise, political and organizational talents and honored for his consistency and struggles by the vote of the Greek people, will be one of the most valuable and close associates of Andreas G. Papandreou in the difficult task he will undertake on 18 October 1981.

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## PROFILE OF NIKITAS VENIZELOS PUBLISHED

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek No 688, 8-14 Oct 81 p 17

/Text/ He was born in Athens in 1930 to Kypiakos Venizelos, son of Eleutherios Venizelos and Marika Roussou. He is married and has seven children. He spent his childhood in Athens, Paris and New York because of the irregular political situation in Greece and the incessant persecution of his family. He was the favorite grandson of Eleutherios Venizelos who kept him by his side.

He studied economics at USC. He became involved in politics following the death of Sofocles Venizelos in 1964. He served under G. Papandreu. During the dictatorship he joined the resistance. In 1967 the dictatorial regime placed him initially under surveillance and then because of his activities it lifted his passport. He escaped abroad.

He returned secretly to Crete, brought in weapons and organized resistance groups in Athens, Salonica and Crete. Many members of these groups were arrested and taken to the Greek Military Police and to exile.

In 1973 he organized the attempted takeover of two training ships for the Naval Academy in San Raphael, France. He participated in the navy mutiny of the destroyed "Velos" and in recognition of his services (he took care of officers and crew) he received the emblem "Velos" with the approval of the Greek Ministry of Defense.

Deputy

He was elected deputy for Khandia /Crete/ in 1974 with 16,000 personal preference votes, a unique event in a district with a single preference. His political activity during that period was one of exploring the country's political conditions. He again was elected deputy for Khandia in 1977 in spite of the considerable decline suffered by the Union of the Democratic Center /EDIK/.

In the 1977-1981 period he was very active in political and party affairs. He fought to save the existence and to put together again the traditional Center. Following Kavaros' withdrawal he was elected to the three-member Executive Committee of EDIK and was influential in the election of Zigdis to the party's leadership, in the belief that he would be able to maintain its unity.

Disappointed at the rigid, combative policy of the party's leadership and the continuing withdrawal of cadres, he undertook an effort to unify the forces of the wider Center area, convinced that the presence of the Center as a unified political organization is a national necessity for the country. At every opportunity he declared, "I was born in the Center, I will remain of the Center."

In the 1978 municipal election he supported the present mayor of Kania and 11 of the 25 members of the Kania city council belong to his camp. In March 1981 he denounced the memorial service organized at Akrotiri by Rallis and Mitsotakis as part of their effort to broaden the appeal [of New Democracy], and PASOK for its effort to tone down the impression caused among the liberal Cretans by the notorious "Tzoumakas" circular [with its heavy Marxist orientation].

On 12 August 1981 he reconstructed the Liberal Party when he saw that it was impossible for the Center forces to come together. In the 18 October 1981 elections he will run as a candidate in the Second District of Athens. He reached this decision following the reestablishing of the Liberal Party because he wants to be elected by more representative voters in mainland Greece.

#### Parliamentary Activity

During the previous 4-year period (1977-1981) he was very active in the Chamber of Deputies with speeches, questions (209) and starred questions (36). By way of illustration we mention the starred questions on the proper functioning of the constitutional system (Karamanlis-Tsatsos) and the national questions, Greek-Turkish relations, Patriarchate, Aegean, Cyprus, etc., as well as the people's social and economic problems.

As a representative of the Greek legislature to the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Committee and other international organizations and councils, he defended the great national questions. He displayed particular sensitivity for the Greek-Turkish relations (Turkish journalists branded him "anti-Turk") and for the national integrity and security of the Greek area with the result that the Greek and foreign press repeatedly reported on his speeches and fighting spirit.

He wrote many articles in the press, defending the liberal tradition, the "Great Idea," and criticizing severely the defeatism of today's political life.

7520  
CSO: 4621/20



## AID AGENCY ENDING DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 Oct 81 p 8

[Article by Einar Kristian Holtet]

[Text] In early November the last Norwegian professional people will be coming home from Vietnam. NORAD [Norwegian Directorate for Development Aid] has definitively withdrawn a total of 120 million kroner that had been "frozen" after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. This means that Norway contributed 200 million kroner to the development of Vietnam in the 1970's, assistant secretary Ole Andreas Lund told AFTENPOSTEN. Lund has visited Vietnam recently in connection with phasing out aid to that country and characterized the situation as precarious.

"I have had an opportunity to see how the food situation has developed ever since 1973, before the Americans withdrew," Lund said. "During the war most Vietnamese seemed well-supplied. Most people looked good in spite of the horrors of war. But in the years since 1975 things have declined gradually. Today it looks as if there is widespread poverty. Children seem to be getting a minimum level of the food that is available and are doing fairly well. But an increasing number of the adults seemed emaciated," said Lund. "It is tragic to see hardworking people like the Vietnamese kept on the verge of starvation. It has been maintained that Norway should continue the aid program for another year to make sure the highly technical equipment we supplied will be handled properly. NORAD should try to follow things up and not be so stubborn. even when formally the aid has come to an end. Otherwise some of what we have done will prove to have been wasted, some people say."

Experts support meeting requests for technical assistance to maintain and operate the equipment, including processing equipment for fish, even after the Norwegian assistance ends. Norway has participated in the construction of four fish processing plants with freezing and cooling equipment. Following demands in Storting investment in the boatbuilding program was cut drastically and Vietnam received only two boats in addition to the two trawlers, "Ha Long 406" and "Ha Long 407" which were built in Norway. NORAD helped in getting the two new vessels built at a Vietnamese shipyard. Originally NORAD was to have assisted in getting five trawlers of the same type built. The "Ha Long" vessels, which are connected with the fishing center of that name, were the ones Norwegian experts in Vietnam last year accused of having been involved in shooting at Vietnamese boat refugees.

After these alleged episodes NORAD reduced its aid to the boat program by 15 million kroner.

NORAD contributed 50 million kroner to the freezing and cooling plants on shore. Of this roughly 35 million went to pay for equipment produced in Norway. One of the first three freezer plants burned down a few months ago. The other two are now being operated by Vietnamese. The fourth and last will be delivered at the end of October. It is the largest and cost Norway 20 million kroner. It lies on the west coast of the "Parrot's Beak" in South Vietnam, in Ras Gia. Vietnam is building roads and docks for this plant and will take care of electricity and water supplies--along with all the labor needed, of course.

NORAD has set the date for its own withdrawal from Vietnam assistance for 31 October. But there is a lot of work left--at the rehabilitation center for war invalids, among other areas.

NORAD has a permanent delegation in Hanoi. This office will be closed at the end of the year.

6578

CSO: 3108/7



## AD PERCEIVED AS LAUNCHING NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST EANES

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 25 Sep 81 p 47

[Article: "AD Sectors Starting New Campaigns Against Eanes"]

[Text] The president of the republic, who toured the municipality of Montijo, on the southern bank of the Tagus, yesterday, Thursday, visiting the "Montiagri 81" Fair, and various industrial enterprises in the area, did not comment on the charges which had been directed at him 2 days earlier by the PSD's [Social Democratic Party] Standing Commission.

These accusations, which were published through a communique distributed to the news media, strongly criticizing the visits that he is making to various local governments in the country, have been interpreted in various political circles, especially those close to Belem, as part of a new AD [Democratic Alliance] campaign against Ramalho Eanes.

On the eve of adopting particularly unpopular measures, the government is said to be attempting to divert public attention toward the presidency, as has occurred at times in the past. In this connection, the parties which comprise it are attempting to create "political facts" involving the action of the head of state, to be launched at the appropriate time.

According to our sources, the presidency of the republic does not consider it desirable to respond to the criticism that has arisen. And, in fact, Ramalho Eanes did not comment on it during the visit paid to Montijo, at the unanimous invitation of the local chamber. Moreover, the president of the republic only visits the municipalities when the invitation tendered him has been unanimously decided on by the local governments.

Oddly enough, the majority in those municipalities is controlled by members of AD, particularly PSD. For example, this holds true of the Chamber of Gondomar, near Porto, which the president of the republic will visit on Saturday. Another forthcoming visit is the one that he will make to Viana do Castelo (on a date to be set), where the head of the town council is also a member of PSD.

Hence, the perplexity has become great, inasmuch as it is prominent personages in AD (from PSD) who are not only unknowledgeable of the desire of their party, but are also to some extent opposed to that desire.

Moreover, it is often strange to hear the tone of the speeches delivered by local PSD and CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] leaders with respect to the president of the republic, in connection with the disregard which they accuse the central authority (the AD government) of having shown them.

#### Defense of Democracy

In his remarks, the president of the republic usually cites the importance of the local governments, their life and their culture, upholding the need for a real, increasing regional decentralization.

The aforementioned text of the PSD Standing Commission accuses the head of state of "aiming to obtain easy popularity through a statement of ideal goals;" but notes that "the present situation in the country does not allow them to be attained fully or within a short time."

Hence, the PSD "regrets that the president of the republic has assumed a style of speaking and making political demands which the very forces of democratic opposition reject;" hence it "repudiates the threats implied in General Eanes' statements, delivered in Elvas (another PSD municipality);" and it declares, "solemnly, that it is ready, as always, to battle against any plans for personal power."

As everyone is aware, all of Eanes' trips are announced in advance to the prime minister, who is also often invited to travel to the municipalities in question, owing to the fact that they are municipalities in which his party or AD is in the majority. In Montijo, Pinto Balsemao was represented by the state secretary of internal administration, Carlos da Encarnacao.

At the welcoming session with which he was honored, Eanes said: "The defense of democracy is real, and its consolidation is achieved only when there is an unhesitating pooling of political efforts and desires for the fulfillment of its pledges, converting the responsibilities assumed during electoral periods or in the assertions of coherence in programs into actions."

He later remarked: "The suburban or semi-urban areas established next to socially and economically developed centers are undergoing the pressure from needs which arise in the large cities, but which lack the proper means for fulfillment;" and that, therefore, "The exercise of local authority under these circumstances is admittedly difficult."

#### Belem: Denies and Repudiates

The Presidency of the Republic, which has ignored the stop in Lisbon made by the president of the People's Republic of Angola, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, reported by EXPRESSO, therefore denies any meeting between the two heads of state to be held in Lisbon.

At the same time, it once again repudiates quite vehemently the claims disseminated by AD sectors concerning the formation of an Intelligence Service to be created by Belem.

## PCP, FEARING RIGHTWARD SHIFT OF PS, PROPOSES COOPERATION

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 2 Oct 81 p 8

[Article: "PCP Proposes Platform for a 'New Majority'"]

[Text] The PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] Central Committee, "deeming the common action of democrats a national imperative," has proposed to the PS [Socialist Party] which it describes as consisting of "independent democrats", a five-point platform as a working base for the establishment of a "new majority" capable of replacing AD [Democratic Alliance].

Meeting over the weekend at its headquarters on Soeiro Pereira Gomes Street, the Portuguese Communist Party Central Committee expressed its willingness to "examine with all the other democratic forces, specifically the PS, and with independent democrats, all the problems relating to the political situation, the revision of the Constitution and a democratic alternative." For this purpose, the PCP submitted as a working proposal a platform consisting of five essential points: "defense of the Constitution and of the democratic regime; defense of the workers' interests and of the people's living conditions; solution to the economic crisis and development of the country; a guarantee of national independence and dignity; defeat of AD and a democratic alternative." In the final document, the Central Committee extended the "contacts and exchanges of opinions" to be fostered by the party's Political Commission, to include "elements with liberal sentiments within the orbit of the PSD [Social Democratic Party]."

Moreover, this platform constitutes the main innovation resulting from the aforementioned plenary session, together with the ratification of the expulsion of the militant, Julio Pinto, from the party (see report elsewhere).

Criticism of the PR [President of the Republic] and the PS

According to the PCP, the majority in power desires, in the final analysis, "to destroy democracy and to establish another dictatorship." Hence, in the interpretation that it makes of events, it regards the formation of the new AD government as "a serious mistake." To the PCP, Mario Soares, the president of the republic and the Council of the Revolution are jointly responsible for giving AD the opportunity to form this government: The first-named, because he threw to AD "a lifebuoy at the very time when AD was beginning to sink;" the others, because "they did not correctly assess" the dangers to democracy stemming from the solution which was found.

In the evaluation made by the PCP Central Committee of the current political situation, it notes that the new government "has reinstated the subversive, coup-related plan to liquidate the democratic regime;" a plan focused, on the one hand, on "military conspiracy" and, on the other hand, on an "unconstitutional revision of the Constitution." From the Communist standpoint, the former is based on the Ministries of Defense and Internal Administration, headed by Freitas do Amaral and Angelo Correia, respectively. As for the revision of the Constitution, carried out according to the plan intended by AD, it "represents a mortal danger to democracy." The PCP even mentions "an authentic coup d'etat, aimed at liquidating democracy." which is why it considers the materialization of the Democratic Alliance plan "a vital issue."

The Central Committee's document (like the statements made by Alvaro Cunhal at the press conference as well) pays particular heed to the constitutional revision. The Communist leader states: "With the revision, AD is seeking not only to take steps to eliminate all the rulings associated with the great democratic conquests, but also to proceed to the assault and total seizure of power, liquidating the Council of the Revolution, removing the president of the republic and turning over to the AD government the appointment of the military chiefs; thus restoring a fascist-oriented military hierarchy, with the mission of giving armed support to AD's counterrevolutionary plan."

As it had already done in connection with the formation of this government the PCP directs serious criticism at the behavior of the Socialist Party, now calling attention to "the real service that the PS would render to the AD's coup-related plan" if it were to establish with this coalition the "so-called regime consensus or pact."

As a type of "democratic solution to the crisis," the Central Committee submits a proposal based on the following points: the dismissal of the AD government, the formation of a caretaker government, the dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic and the holding of early elections. In the PCP's view, from the consultation of the electorate there could emerge a "new, democratic majority" which would serve as a basis for a "democratic government" that would guarantee the legal revision of the Constitution.

By a new majority, the PCP means "a majority of democrats, in which Communists and Socialists have an important role to play." It is in this context that the five-point platform that we have already cited appears.

Hence, the PCP refuses the "central bloc" resulting from a possible alliance between the PS and the PSD. The PCP's Central Committee explains: "The central bloc would necessarily be an alliance in the service of a rightwing policy, very close to what that of AD has been." The document illustrates this claim with what it describes as the "leading current reflections of that alliance": the convergence of the FRS [Socialist Republican Front] and AD plans for revision of the Constitution, the backing for the UGT [General Union of Workers], and the agreements against the APU [United People's Alliance] and the PCP in the local governments, specifically in Loures.

2909

CSO: 3101/6

## AD SEEKING COOPERATION OF PS ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 2 Oct 81 p 9

[Article by F.A.: "AD Filled with Solicitude Toward PS"]

[Text] Not to antagonize the Socialists nor to create poles of discussion that would hamper the progress of the work on the constitutional revision is currently the government's major concern in the parliamentary area.

After the unexpected outburst which marked the last day of the debates on the government program, and the verbal irrationality that appeared to be overshadowing the understanding between AD [Democratic Alliance] and PS [Socialist Party] in the specific realm of the revision of the Constitution, the government majority redoubled its solicitude with regard to the Socialists.

An attempt is now being made to eliminate all the minor disputes that any slip might exacerbate, jeopardizing the success of the possible negotiations for the formation of the two thirds majority of deputies present required by Article 286 of the Constitution.

For instance, the priority given by PSD [Social Democratic Party] to the parliamentary debate on changes in the bylaws and statutes of the Assembly of the Republic did not initially have the backing of the entire government majority. The Popular Monarchists reportedly alerted the Social Democratic political leadership in time to the dangers involved in an unnecessary rekindling of focal points of friction between Socialists and FRS [Socialist Republican Front], on the one hand, and the majority deputies backing the AD government, on the other. But the proposal to use a supplementary period for discussing the bylaws and statutes, which large sectors of the majority consider a necessary requisite for fruitful endeavor in the Assembly of the Republic, did not meet with any appreciable hesitation. Moreover, for the first time, the opposition (all of it, without exception) even refused to vote on the Social Democrats' proposal, because it regarded the latter as "nonsensical" and a despicable violence, in terms of disrespect for the minimal rules on rights of the minorities. Bringing up for discussion a bill for bylaws and statutes revision which deeply curtails the voice of the opposition, restricting areas of intervention and oversimplifying the internal arrangement of Parliament, would not be acceptable under any circumstances, much less in such a brief period of time as that proposed for the supplementary interval. Furthermore, preceding the assessment of issues as fundamental as the constitutional revision, the debate on the

OGE [General State Budget] and other important laws, this "acceleration", possibly with all-day sessions, could only be explained by the need to lend Parliament bylaws and statutes that would facilitate the strategy of AD and the government in the "passage" of their political proposals.

#### 'Negotiation' With PS and Down to a Commission

During the past few days there has not exactly been a sign of hesitancy on the part of the majority or the government but, according to parliamentary sources, the government strategists, sensing the unusual nature of a reaction considered to be highly unfeasible and unsuited to their interests, may have reached agreement on the need to prove and to guarantee to the Socialists that the proposal to bring up the assessment of the bylaws and statutes would not have either the seriousness nor the dimensions that the opposition feared. According to the same sources, the AD majority will take down to a commission on bylaws, statutes and mandates the bill that was meant to be considered by a specialized commission, which again postpones the voting on the future bylaws and statutes indefinitely.

Despite this guarantee given to the Socialists (a guarantee which has its justification in the policy of avoiding more serious breaks, with inevitable effects on the balance of the advantages toward which the constitutional revision is aimed), both the PS and the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] claim to be ready to challenge the convocation of Parliament under the terms and circumstances desired by the majority.

Moreover, the PCP also submitted a proposal for the convocation of a supplementary session, which the majority rejected. Its purpose was to discuss more urgent matters, such as the establishment of a committee to investigate the liberalization of the grain trade. The Socialists are also, in principle, receptive to a supplementary period, provided it is devoted exclusively to the consideration of undeferrable matters.

Meanwhile, there is an intention on the government's part to renew, at one of the next plenary sessions, the bill relating to university autonomy, leaving for a better occasion the proposal relating to the delimitation of the administration's investments.

2909

CSO: 3101/6



## PAPER COMMENTS ON POOR SHOWING BY NONSOCIALIST PARTIES IN POLL

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Oct 81 p 2

[Editorial by Olof Kleberg]

[Text] Things now look bleak for Sweden's first middle-spectrum government. After roughly 4 months in power, voter opinion support for the middle continues to decline. In the IMU [Institute for Market Surveys] poll published in DAGENS NYHETER today the Center Party has clearly declined since early summer and the downward trend of the Liberal Party appears to be continuing.

The survey was conducted in the last 3 weeks of September when the government presented its economic program--but when the Social Democratic Party congress had barely begun. Despite this, voter support for the middle government declined. That the government was practically invisible until mid-September may have had some significance here.

But now it has begun to rule. The economic program is an important element, the tax reform that should emerge from the settlement with the Social Democrats is another. And several interesting initiatives were promised in the government statement presented this week: programs to combat acid pollution and alcoholism and drug abuse, a new law against limiting competition, proposals on research, computer policy and small business subsidies.

But the core of the government policy will remain the economy. Savings must be employed in the broader context as one of the methods to lead Sweden out of the crisis.

The Conservatives continue to lie a good bit above the 1979 election result--but also a good bit away from government power. The new Environment Party which was not formed until the middle of the survey period was included in the poll. Party activists are certain to be delighted--but without much reason for the time being.

The weakness of the middle contrasts with the strength of the Social Democrats. Over half those questioned supported the party. It is also interesting that the party appears to be attracting disappointed Communist Left voters who may feel their party promised too much at one time.

The Social Democrats have the advantage of being able to act as a unified government alternative. This provides strength in argumentation. The fact that the party presented its own crisis program may also be significant. But the most important reason for the large support for the Social Democrats is not so positive for the party. It is more irritation over the disputes among the nonsocialist parties and continued wariness about the decline in the standard of living than enthusiasm for funds and crisis programs which has benefited the Social Democrats.

Therefore there is not yet any reason for the Social Democrats to rejoice or for the middle parties to throw in the towel. There is still a long way to the watershed that will decide things, a march of almost a whole year.

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CSO: 3106/19



## POLL REGISTERS RECORD LEAD FOR SOCIALIST PARTIES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Oct 81 p 7

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] The Social Democrats have gained 4 percentage points and the Center Party has lost 3. This is shown by the IMU [Institute for Market Surveys] voter barometer for September, the first since the summer recess. The socialist bloc as a whole has 56 percent of the votes compared to 40.5 percent for the three nonsocialist parties. The gap between the blocs is at a record high at the beginning of the year leading up to the election.

The gain for the Social Democrats and the decline for the Center are statistically reliable. Other changes in the voter barometer are within the margin of error. For the first time in a long while the Communist Left Party ended up below the 4-percent parliamentary barrier.


The voter survey was made from 7 to 30 September, a period in which there were many big political events. The middle-spectrum government presented its economic package with devaluation and the proposal to reduce the value-added tax on 14 September. The LO [Federation of Trade Unions] congress took place during the latter part of the survey period and the Social Democratic congress was almost ready when the survey came to an end.

The previous voter survey was conducted from 18 May to 10 June in connection with the split in the nonsocialist three-party government. One explanation for the big changes in the latest survey could be that several months have gone by since the previous survey.

The results were: Conservatives, 23.5 (+ 0.5), Liberals, 6 percent (-1), Center, 11 percent (-3), Christian Democratic Party, 2 percent (-0.5), Social Democrats, 52.5 (+ 4), Communist Left 3.5 (- 0.5), Environment Party, 1.5, other parties 0 (- 1).

## Center Slump Hard to Explain

The Conservative Party has registered an upward trend in the last two surveys, but the changes are within the margin of error and are less than many Conservatives thought after the defection from the government in the spring. The government crisis weakened the nonsocialist bloc.



- Key:
- 1. Social Democrats
  - 2. Conservatives
  - 3. Center
  - 4. Liberals
  - 5. Communist Left
  - 6. Nonsocialist bloc (Center, Conservatives and Liberals)
  - 7. Socialist bloc (Social Democrats, and Communist Left)

The long-range trend is going the other way for the Liberal Party. The Liberal Party declined from 9 percent in April to 6 percent in September.

The Center Party's big decline in the September survey is hard to explain. The Center Party has been around 14 percent for more than a year, but now it has plummeted to 11 percent. Even though the decline is statistically reliable it cannot be treated as important in the long run. Before that happens the decline must be confirmed by future surveys.

The Social Democrats have increased markedly in two succeeding surveys, from 45.5 percent in April to its record high of 52.5 percent now.

#### VPK Below Barrier

VPK [Communist Left], on the other hand, noted a different trend, declining from 6.5 percent in April to 3.5 percent in September, bringing the party below the 4-percent barrier. Even though the long-range tendency is clear one cannot yet draw the conclusion that VPK really risks ending up outside of parliament since the decline is not statistically reliable.

The new Environment Party is included in the survey for the first time, receiving 1.5 percent. Ballots were also provided for the Environment Party.

The gap between the blocs has grown. In June the nonsocialist parties had 44 percent compared to the socialist bloc's 52.5 percent, a difference of 8.5 percent. In September the difference had grown to 14.5 percent with 40.5 for the nonsocialists and 55 percent for the socialist parties.

The break down figures in the survey are too unreliable to be assigned any great significance. But it did appear that the big Social Democratic gain occurred primarily in medium-sized cities and in rural areas.

	<u>Survey 11</u>	<u>Survey 12</u>	<u>Survey 13</u>
	<u>6/4-29/4 1981</u>	<u>18/5-10/6 1981</u>	<u>7/9-31/9 1981</u>
Number eligible voters with party sympathy interviewed (used as basis for percentage)	829	836	856
Percentage listing as best party:			
Conservative Party	22.0%	23.0%	23.5%
Liberal Party	9.0	7.0	6.0
Center Party	14.0	14.0	11.0
Christian Democratic Party	2.0	2.5	2.0
Social Democrats	45.5	48.5	52.5
Communist Left Party	6.5	4.0	3.5
Environment Party	--	--	1.5
Other parties	1.0	1.0	0.0
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

	<u>Survey 11</u>	<u>Survey 12</u>	<u>Survey 13</u>
Percentage of eligible voters not listing a "best party"	4.5%	5.0%	6.5%

So far 13 surveys of party preferences have been conducted. The Social Democratic increase of 4 percentage points and the Center decline of 3 percentage points are statistically reliable changes between the last two survey periods.

The survey was conducted with a nationwide representative sample of Swedish citizens aged 18 to 74. Interviews were conducted by means of home visits. The following question was asked: "Which party do you think is the best one?" An election situation was represented by having preferences expressed with the help of "ballots" and "ballot envelopes."

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6578

CSO: 3109/19

## SUCCESSFUL TESTING, PLANNED PRODUCTION OF PENGUIN B3

Bonn WERTECHNIK in German Sep 81 pp 64, 67

[Article by Harry Scholz: "Penguin B3 - A New Remote Control Mine Destruction Vehicle"]

[Text] Classical defense measures against ground mines, even if they have only limited applicability, still consist in deceiving the detonation devices through simulation or in the case of buoyant mines in severing the chain or cable and making the mines rise to the surface where they can then be destroyed. A newer, better and safer method of combating existing types of mines, developed since 1964, is mine chasing. Mine chasers with built-in sonar devices and remote control mine destruction vehicles play an important role in this. Harry Scholz, who is responsible for studies and projects in the field of naval technology at VFW in Bremen, describes a new mine destruction vehicle in the following article which was developed out of company funds by VFW, MBB's division of naval and special technology. Penguin B3 is a variation of Penguin A1, developed on orders of the defense ministry and whose further development is being pursued separately to prepare it for other use. In June 1981, performance tests of a Penguin B3 prototype were successfully completed. At present, preparations are being made to go into series production. Joint tests with the navy on the B3 are scheduled for later this fall.

Penguin B3, developed by MBB's naval and special technology division, is an underwater vehicle especially designed to identify underwater objects and to combat sea mines. The vehicle makes use of experiences gained in stroke engine technology, automatic control technology, data processing and data transmission, in lightweight construction/structural mechanics and in modular construction. This means that the Penguin B3 has a high performance and payload ratio; a high degree of maneuverability; automatic course, depth and speed controls; digital data transmission; adaptation and integration capability of special components (such as close range sonar, ultrasonic imaging system, residual light camera, cutting devices).

As compared to existing mine destruction vehicles of the first generation, the Penguin B3 has the following advantages: greater effectiveness in that it can release two charges as well as utilization of greater speed; capability of identifying and combating mines even under adverse conditions (ability to operate without regard to the sea bottom or strong currents); largely automated, safe target approach, which serves to relieve service personnel of some duties; greater probability of success of mission; compatibility with all known mine chasing systems; integration capability with almost all known mine defense vehicle concepts; equipment with special accessories.

Penguin B3 consists of a cylindrical main body with two propeller engines aft which are parallel to the horizontal axis and at a hydrodynamically neutral position along the vertical axis. The vehicle is 3.5m long; the diameter of the pressure chamber is 0.7m. With an overall weight (including two mine destruction charges) of 1,350 kg, Penguin B3 attains an underwater speed of more than five knots.

Position and course of the vehicle are stabilized automatically by means of an electronic, gyro-controlled control system (a variation of the control system of the vertical take-off VAX-191B). Forward movement is regulated by means of thrust modulation of the two engines; vertical movement is regulated by hydroplanes set into the slipstream of the propulsion units and by means of thrust modulation of the vertical propulsion unit, with the latter enabling the vehicle to stay in position at a given depth. A special weight equalization unit compensates for the static lift imparted to the vehicle when the two charges are released. Energy supply is provided by a battery on board the vehicle.

The service and display elements for manual and/or automatic control of the vehicle are all located in the steering and control console. Steering commands and position data are transmitted digitally via cable between the console and the vehicle.

Construction details of the Penguin B3 are consonant with environmental conditions, providing for protection against shock and vibration as well as against noise and magnetism.

Due to its technical performance data, its modular construction and its resultant capability to adapt to a variety of accessory elements, Penguin B3 also figures to be an addition and new departure in the field of existing underwater vehicles for civilian use.

The vehicle could be given underwater jobs to do along the continental shelf and could search for and locate objects at the bottom of the sea. Other uses would be the supervision of technical installations; the support of salvage operations and control functions in combating pollution of the oceans. Equipped with the proper instruments, Penguin B3 could provide oceanographic data such as water density, temperature, salt content, ocean currents, light permeability, information about the earth's magnetic field, etc. It could also be given specific research assignments in the fields of marine biology, marine geology and underwater cartography.



On an actual mission, the Penguin B3 uses a buoy as its point of reference. During the search phase, the sea bottom is swept several hundred meters ahead by the mine chaser's sonar. Objects classified as "mine-like" are recorded by a documentation unit. Thereupon, Penguin B3 is launched into the water and, as it initially floats on the surface, is manually steered in the direction of the sonar beam toward the first object.

Then, the mine chaser officer assumes responsibility for steering in the operations center and starts the automatic diving sequence and target approach by pre-setting the target course, speed and diving depth.

As the vehicle approaches the target, its speed can be reduced to zero. In this manner, exact object identification by means of a highly sensitive, built-in camera is made possible. The necessary light is provided by two spotlights built into the propulsion engines. Once the object has been identified, either of the two mine charges is released in the immediate vicinity of the object. The resulting shift in the center of gravity is compensated by the weight equalization unit which provides for retention of desired depth and position.

Immediately thereafter, another object located within the sonar beam can be approached and attacked, if necessary. After the target approaches are completed, the vehicle is resurfaced and, for the sake of practicality, steered back to ship manually.

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## NEED FOR RELIGIOUS CLASSES, MAINTENANCE OF SECULARISM EYED

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[Article by Prof Orhan Aldikacti]

[Text] Debates on the topic of secularism have gained momentum once again now that the Ministry of National Education is making plans to place required religion courses in educational curricula. Secularism is one of the principles that Ataturk wanted us to understand and pursue as an inescapable quality of the republic so that we could attain the level of Western civilization. As a matter of fact, during the days in which plans were being made to establish the Free Republican Party, Fethi Bey wrote in a letter to his colleague, "I am resolved to jump into the political arena with a secular party in the full sense of the word." Ataturk replied, "I see again, with pleasure, that we are agreed on the principle of secularism. I consider it essential to the republic to discuss state affairs freely with a new party that supports the same thesis in the Grand National Assembly." Ataturk hereby announced that the principle of secularism is one of the elements of the founding of the newly created Republic of Turkey and of development. Nevertheless, secularism has been misunderstood in our country since its inception and was debated with increasing intensity when the transition was made to a multiparty system between 1946 and 1950.

The concept, as can be ascertained from the word itself, comes from the West and began to be put into practice in the first days of the development of democracy, a system of government based on liberty.

When man has attempted to find a system to develop and protect material and spiritual values, religion has been seen as an element that causes discrimination among men. As a matter of fact, supporters of any religion or religious creed that has been in the majority in the community have placed pressure on those believing in another religion and on those who have no religious beliefs and have prevented them from benefiting from the rights and freedoms they themselves enjoyed. They have even gone so far as to try them in Inquisition courts and burn them at the stake in order to open up the doors to heaven to their souls. However, as democracy

developed, freedom of thought was accepted as one of the irrevocable basic rights of a democratic system. It also became necessary to recognize freedom of belief as an extension of freedom of thought, as a sacred right of man. In this way, the rule was set down that, in order for there to be equality among men, religion must cease being an element for discrimination. In other words, men were not to be oppressed because of religious beliefs. However, the first philosophers to consider religious freedom lived in states attached to a religion. A state attached to a religion is one whose activities are carried out and in which relations between the state and the individual are regulated in accordance with the religion. Those who are in power belong to the religion of the state. One of the requirements for holding power is religion. Therefore, seeking to eliminate religion as a structural element of the state would deprive the state of one of its strongest supports. For this reason, those who sought to defend the religious state and those who supported the established system became one and the same. Those who believed in religious freedom called for secularism to do away with religion as an element that had an effect on the affairs of the state. Later, the entire struggle was transformed into one that pitted supporters of secularism against supporters of the established system, and, because the system that secularists wished to change had religion as a foundation, supporters of religion began to view secularists as enemies of religion.

Secularists, however, only wanted to put an end to the privileges accorded religion by the state. They were not against religion in general (some were, but they were in the minority). Their purpose in wishing to end the privileges was to ensure equality among individuals. And, with the achievement of their purpose, religion was to continue to be the source of belief and everyone was to be free to carry out their religious duties under the condition that this "did not conflict with the general morality or the public system of government."

#### Examples from West

However, secularism at the same time created a problem of religious training. In a state attached to a religion, there is no objection in religion being seen as a constructive element of the state, in religion being seen by the state as part of its educational affairs. But, when defending the principle of secularism, when defending the severing of religious ties with the state, and when approving equal rights for citizens of various religions and creeds, it is claimed that the state cannot give instruction in only one religion and that taxes collected from persons of various beliefs or no beliefs cannot be used to provide instruction in one religion. This view has been adopted by several nations. However, those who wish to give their children religious training have opened "private schools" (independent schools) that include religious instruction. However, immediately after opening, these schools, believing they could not continue to exist with their own resources, have asked the state for financial help. Just as an individual has the right to be happy, to ask the state for help when his power to obtain material and moral values is

lacking, doesn't he have the right to ask the state to supplement his inadequate resources for religious training? Doesn't this form of aid come under the function of the state and even within the concept of a social state? In other words, shouldn't the state help private schools? This question is still being strongly debated in several countries. Private schools in France, a country whose secularism we have used as a major example in Turkey, were subsidized by the 1951 Barange Law. Now with Mitterand in power, it is felt that aid will be cut off in the near future through a decision that reflects his concept of secularism. In Belgium, the situation is the same and is being debated.

However, despite the fact that secularism, at its essence, is an issue of freedom and that the principle of nondiscrimination between persons of differing religions and creeds is adopted in democracies, various practices are observed on this issue.

Article 7 of West Germany's constitution sets forth the principle that religious training is optional, but also lays down the rule that classes are compulsory in religious schools. Education is entirely under the control of the national government. In some states of West Germany, the topic is more closely supervised. Article 131 of the Bavarian constitution requires teaching institutions not only to furnish information, but also to build character. It states that a goal of education is to create respect for God, religious beliefs, and human dignity. Articles 29 and 30 of the Rhineland constitution regulate the religious instruction given in official schools.

In Switzerland, participation in religious classes is not required (Article 49 of the constitution). However, some cantons have included religion classes in the curricula, and some cantons (Bern, Fribourg, and St. Gallen) have placed statutes regarding religious principles in education in their constitutions.

In summary, each country deals with the topic of religious training in accordance with its own needs and without harming the principle of equality among men. No one method has been found that cannot be debated, that crystallizes the issue.

#### Situation in Turkey

The principle of secularism in Turkey was put into practice in a manner different from that in the West.

The idea, which is one of the foundations of individual rights and freedom in the West, was acknowledged and implemented as a requirement of freedom. Following acceptance in our nation in the 1924 Constitution of the principle of national sovereignty, which is the scholarly expression for the democratic system of government, the problem of secularism required a solution. However, our country approached this difficult topic of constitutional law through another door. First of all, it must not be forgotten

that the Ottoman Empire was based on a theocratic system in the full sense of the word. The head of state was the head of the entire Islamic world, not only Turkey. And in the declining years of the Ottoman Empire, religion constantly came out against reform efforts. Those who felt that they would experience harm in any manner whatsoever from the new movements that were being proposed and those who supported the established system sought to use religion as a weapon against these efforts. This was also one of the characteristics of the period of the collapse of the empire. Decline took place in every area, but particularly among the scholarly class, and religion was used against all movements for renewal by persons who were inadequate from the standpoint of education and training.

Ataturk, who made this historical observation, saw the need to start the reforms with religion if the radical changes were to bring the Turkish people to the level of contemporary civilization and if religion was to cease being used as a political force, as a weapon to be used against reforms in the community. This was only possible by separating religious and affairs of state from one another. In other words, the principle of secularism in Turkey grew out of a reason different from that in the West. With secularism, the West made a basic change in its educational system. The state left religious education to private, independent schools. In Turkey, application of this system would have resulted in a very large majority of those providing religious training and giving religion classes being unqualified and uninformed. Religion would again have been used against reforms. This development would be able to be halted by the state's taking responsibility for religious education personally. It is for this reason that the Caliphate was eliminated, the uniting of secularism and religious training was accepted by law (the Religious Instruction Law), and the state was given the duty of providing this education. In this way, religious training was begun in official schools in cities and villages. However, time demonstrated that this measure was not sufficient. For this reason, religious training was removed from the schools in the cities first, in 1929, and then from the schools in the villages, in 1939 following Ataturk's death. Thereby, mothers and fathers who wished to give their children a religious education were deprived of this possibility or were forced to be content with passing on the limited knowledge they possessed. At this time, those with no religious beliefs went into action and, from time to time, were seen to engage in actions and operations against religion. This development was conducted in the name of the secularism that was in practice through the Religious Instruction Law. Nevertheless, as could be seen, it was difficult to establish a relationship between secularism and a people's being deprived of religious training, of religious knowledge. It was not possible to equate the lack of religious education with secularism. Even though official spokesmen constantly repeated that secularism does not mean atheism, that secularism is a freedom of conscience, a matter of religious freedom, because those who wished to give their children religious information were unsuccessful in doing so and raised their children deprived of

religious training, it was quite easy for the belief that secularism is the same as atheism to be born and to grow. In essence, although characteristics differed in Turkey, the result of accepting the principle of national sovereignty led Turkey to the same point as it did in the West, led to the separation of church and state.

#### To Obtain Information

In 1946, with the advent of the multiparty system and in order to correct the situation, the RPP [Republican People's Party] made efforts to apply the Religious Instruction Law, which commanded that religious training be provided by the state. However, it was not until after 1950 that the DP [Democratic Party] succeeded in placing religious teaching in the primary school curriculum. Those who did not wish their children to attend the religion classes were to inform the school administration at the beginning of the school year. In other words, parents were given the right to give their children the religious training they desired. This system demonstrates that the essence of instruction is not being content with merely passing on religious knowledge, but includes teaching children in accordance with the requirements of the religion. This is not a situation that conflicts with secularism, because, as we attempted to explain, secularism is a principle that rejects using religious beliefs as a source of differentiation among men. Under this system, 99.3 percent of the parents did not oppose the religious instruction given their children during the 1950-1951 school year. To the contrary, the classes that were given were considered insufficient. Even worse, some uneducated religious men with no qualifications began giving religious training outside the official schools, in "schools" located in their neighborhoods. Unfortunately, this situation became a wound that required treatment. It was then that the Ministry of National Education made the decision that was cited previously. Religion classes, it was announced, were to be taught as required classes together with ethics classes. There was an immediate reaction about "secularism." The essence of the reaction was that no religious beliefs whatsoever could be forced on an individual. However, those who supported this view undoubtedly failed to note the difference between inculcation of religious beliefs and enlightening the community about the religion of at least 99 percent of that community. The fact is that, despite the transition from "optional training to actual compulsory training," a significant portion of the Turkish community today does not know the rules of its religion. This means that there has been no change in the situation. The problem of education must be worked on and corrected with due haste. There is no harm in a person's learning all the precepts of a religion, in a person's possessing knowledge. A portion of the persons in the West who have broken away from religion were educated in religious seminaries. It is necessary to remember that, in the end, a member of the community who is cultured is one who is able to discuss all aspects of the community. On the topic of religion, it is necessary to possess knowledge about religion in order to talk with those who believe and those who do not. As can be seen, secularism began in Turkey for the purpose of eliminating a



force that prevented us from becoming a cultured people. This can only be possible through education. With education, the ignorant and religious fanatics can be enlightened. Religion courses that comply with contemporary needs ensure religious knowledge without creating a reaction in students. However, for this, well-trained teachers are necessary. Otherwise, failure is again inevitable. The solution is to implement the decision as qualified teachers are trained. This is undoubtedly a very good reason for postponing implementation for a year.

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